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I
ESSAYS
AND
TREATISE
O N
SEVERAL SUBJECTS. By DAVID HUME, Efq; VOL. II. CONTAINING, /
An E N QJJ I R Y concerning HUMAN UNDERSTANDING;
A DISSERTATION on the PASSIONS;
An ENQJJIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES of MORALS;
AND
The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.
A NEW EDITION.
DUBLIN:
Printed by J. Williams, [No. 21,] Siinner-Roiv,
/
M,DCC,LXXIX.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library
i
http://www.archive.org/details/essaystreatiseso02hume ,
ADVERTISEMENT.
IVX O S T of the principles, and reafonings, con- tained in this volume, were publifhed in a work in three volumes, called A Treatife of Human Nature : A work which the Author had projefted before he left College, and which he wrote and publifhed not long after. But not finding it fuccefsful, he was fenfible of his error in going to the prefs too early, and he call the whole anew in the following pieces, where fome negligences in his former rea- foning, and more in the expreflion, are, he hopes, correfled. Yet feveral writers, who have honoured the Author's Phllofophy with anfwers, have taken care to diredl all their batteries againfb that juve- nile work, which the Author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it : A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a ftrong infhance of thofe pole- mical artifices, wiiich a bigotted zeal thinks itfelf authorifed to employ. Henceforth, the Author defires, that the following Pieces may alone be re- garded as containing his philofophical fentiments and principles.
A a
THE
CONT E NTS
O F T H E
SECOND VOLUME.
An ENQJJIRY concerning HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.
Sedlion Page
I. V-/F the different Species of Philofophy 3 II. Of the Origin of Ideas 17
III. Of the AfTociation of Ideas 23
IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operati-
ons of the Underftanding 27
V. Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts 45
VI. Of Probability 61
VII. Of the Idea of neceflary Connexion 65
VIII. Of Liberty and Neceffity 85
IX. Of the Reafon of Animals 11 1
X. Of Miracles 117
XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future
State 141
XII. Of the academical or fceptical Philofohy 159
A Diflertation on the PalTions I77
An
CONTENTS.
An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES Of MORALS.
Seftion Page
I. V>/F the general Principles of Morals 215
II. Of Benevolence 223
III. Of Juftice 231
IV. Of political Society 253 V. Why Utility pleafes 261
VI. Of Qualities ufeful to Ourfelves 281
VII. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Our- felves 299 VIII. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Others 311 IX. Conclufion 319
APPENDIX.
I. Concerning moral Sentiment 337
II. Of Self-love 349
III. Some farther Confiderations with regard to
Juftice 357
IV. Of fome verbal Difputes 2^^ A Dialogue 377
The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.
Section Page
Introdudlion 401
I. X HAT Polytheifm was the primary
Religion of Men 402
II. Origin of Polytheifm 407
III. The fame Subjedl continued 410
IV. Deities not confidered as Creators or For-
mers of the World 415
V. Various
CONTENTS.
Section
V. Various Forms of Polytheifm : Allegory,
Hero-Worfhip Page 422
VI. Origin of Theifm from Polytheifm 426
VII. Contirmation of this Doftrine 432
VIII. Flux and Reflux of Polytheifm and Theifm
434
IX. Comparifon of thefe Refigions with regard
to Perfecution and Toleration 436
X. With regard to Courage or Abafement 440
XI. With regard to Reafon or Abfurdity 441
XII. With regard to Doubt or Conviction 444
XIII. Impious Conceptions of the divine Nature
in popular Religions of both Kinds 457
XIV. Bad Influence of popular Religions on
Morality 461
XV. General Corollary. 466
AN
A N
E N Q^ U I R Y
CONCERNING
HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING.
Vol. II. B
SECTION I.
Of the Different Species of Philosophy.
iVlORAL philofophy, or the fcience of human nature, may be treated after two different man- ners ; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, in(lru6tion, and reformation of mankind. The one confiders man chiefly as born for adlion ; and as influenced in his meafures by tafle and fentiment ; purfuing one objeft, and avoiding another, according to the value which thefe objeds feem to poflfcfs, and ac- cording to the light in which they prefent them- felves. As virtue, of all objcifls, is allowed to be the mofl: valuable, this fpecies of philolbphers paint her in the moft amiable colours -, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their fubjedt in an eafy and obvious manner, and fuch as is belt fitted to pleafe the imagination, and engage the affections. They fele6l the moil ilriking obfervations and inftances from common life; place oppofite chara6ters in a proper contrafl:; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happinefs, dired our fteps in thefe paths by the foundeft precepts and mofl illuflrious examples. They make us feel the difference be- tween vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our fentiments; and fo they can but bend our hearts
B 2 to
4 S E C T I O N I.
to the love of probity and true honour, they think> that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.
The other fpecies of philofophers confider man in the light of a reafonable rather than an aftivc being, and endeavour to form his underflanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a fubjed of fpeculation j and v/ith a narrow fcrutiny examine it, in order to find thofe principles, which regulate our underftanding, excite our lentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular objefl, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philofophy fhould not yet have fixed, beyond con- troverfy, the foundation of morals, reafoning, and criticifm; and Hiould for ever talk of truth and falfehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the fource of thefe di'fbindions. While they attempt this arduous tafk, they are deterred by no difficulties j but proceed- ing from particular intlances to general principles, they ftill pulh on their enquiries to principles more general, and reft not fatisfied till they arrive at thofe original principles, by which, in every fci- ence, all human curiofity muft be bounded. Though their fpeculations leem abftratt, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wile; and think themfelves fufficiently compenfated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can difcover fome hid- den truths, which may contribute to the inftrudi- on of pofterity.
It is certain that the eafy and obvious philo- fophy, will always, with the generality of man- kind, have the preference above the accurate and ubflrufe ; and by many v/iil be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more ufeful than the other. It enters more into common
lifei
or the Different Species of Philosophy. 5
life J moulds the heart and affeftions ; and, by touching thofe principles which aftuate men, re- forms their condudl, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it defcribes. On the contrary, the abftrufe philofophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into bufmefs and a6lion, vanifhes when the phi- lofopher leaves the fhade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles eafily retain any in- fluence over our condutl and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our paf- fions, the vehemence of our affections, diflipate all its conclufions, and reduce the profound philo- fopher to a mere plebeian.
This alfo muft be confeffcd, that the moft du- rable, as well as julteft fame, has been acquired by the eafy philofophy, and that abftradt reafon- ers feem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momen- tary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to fupporc their renown with more equitable pofterity. It is eafy for a profound philofopher to commit a miftake in his fubtile reafonings ; and one miftake is the neceiTary parent of another, while he pufhes on his confequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclufion, by its unufual appear- ance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philofopher, who purpofes only to reprefenc the common fenfe of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther ; but renewing his appeal to common fenfe, and the natural fen- timents of the mind, returns into the right path, and fecures himfelf from any dangerous illulions. The fame of Cicero flourifhes at prefent ; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere pafles the feas, and ftill maintains his reputa- tion: But the glory of Malebranche is con- fined
6 SECTION I.
fined to his own nation, and to his own agre. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleafure, •when Locke fliall be entirely forgotten.
The mere philofopher is a chara6ler, which is commonly but little acceptable in the v/orld, as being fiippofed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleafure of fociety ; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehenfion. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is ftill more defpifed j nor is any thing deemed a furr fign of an illi- beral genius in an age and nation where the fci- ences flourifh, than to be entirely deflitute of all relifh for thofe noble entertainments. The moft: perfcd character is fuppofed to lie between thofe extremes ; retaining an equal ability and tafte for books, company, and bufinefs ; pre- ferving in converfation that difccrnment and de- licacy which arife from po'ite letters ; and in bu- finefs, that probity and accuracy which are the natural refult of a jufl; philofophy. In order to dif- fufe and cultivate fo accompliflied a chara6ter, nothing can be more ufeful than compofitions of the eafy Ryle and manner, which draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and fend back the ftudent amono; mankind full of noble fentiments and .wife precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of fuch compofitions, virtue becomes amiable, fcience agreeable, com- pany infcrudtive, and retirement entertaining.
Man is a reafonable being; and as fuch, re- ceives from fcience his proper fcod and nou- rilhment : But fo narrow are the bounds of human iinderftanding, that little fatisfadlion can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent or fecurity of Iiis acquilitions. Man is a fociable,
no
or the Different Species of Philosophy. 7
no lefs than a reafonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amufing, or preferve the proper relifh for them. Man is alfo an aftive being; and from that difpofition, as well as from the various necelTities of human life, mull fubmit to bufinefs and occupation : But the mind requires fome relaxation, and cannot al- ways fupport its bent to care and induftry. It feems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as moft fuitable to human race, and fecretly admoniflied them to allow none of thefe biafles to draw too much, lb as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your paffion for fcience, fays fhe, but let your fcience be human, and fuch as may have a diredl reference to aflion and fociety. Ab- ftrufe thought and profound refearches I prohibit, and will feverely punifh, by the penfive melan- choly which they introduce, by the endlefs un- certainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended difcoveries fiiall meet with, when communicated. Be a phi- lofopheri but, amidft all your philofophy, be flill a man.
Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the eafy phiiofophy to the abftraft and pro- found, without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without oppofition, his own tafte and fentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the abfolute rejefting of all profound reafonings, or what is commonly called mctaphyficsy we fhall now proceed to confi- der what can reafonably be pleaded in their be- half.
We may begin with obferving, that one confi- derable advantage, which refults from the accu- rate and abftraft philofophy, is, its fubferviency
to 3
8 S E C T I O N I.
to the eafy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a fufficient degree of ex- adnefs in its fentiments, precepts, or reafonings. All poJite letters are nothing but pi<flures of hu- man life in various attitudes and fituations ; and infpire us with different fentiments, of praife or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the objeft, which they fet before us. An artift muft be better qualified to fucceed in this undertaking, who, befides a delicate tafte and a quick apprehenfion, pofleircs an accurate know- ledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the underftanding, the workings of the paflions, and the various fpecies of fentiment which difcrimi- nate vice and virtue. How painful foever this inward fearch or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in fome meafure, requifite to thofe, who would defcribe with fuccefs the obvious and outward ap- pearances of life and manners. The anatomiil: prefents to the eye the moft hideous and difagree- able obje(5ls3 but his fcience is ufeful to the pain- ter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the richeft colours of his art, and gives his figures the moll grace- ful and engaging airs ; he muft ftill carry his at- tention to the inward itrudure of the human body, the pofition of the mufcles, the fabric of the bones, and the ufe and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every cafe, advantageous to beau- ty, and juft reafoning to delicate fentiment. In -vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.
Befides, we may obferve, in every art or pro- fefiion, even thofe which moft concern life or ac- tion, that a fpirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfedion, and renders them more fubfervient to the intercfts of fociety. And though a philofopher may live re- ivjote from bufinefs, the genius of philofophy, if
carcfullv
Of the Different Species of Philosophy. 9
carefully cultivated by feveral, mufl: gradually diffufe itfelf throughout the whole fociety, and beftow a fimilar corredtnefs pn every art and call- ing. The politician will acquire greater forefight and fubtilty, in the fubdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer princi- ples in his reafonings ; and the general more re- gularity in his difcipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The liability of modern go- vernments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philofophy, have improved, and proba- bly will ftill improve, by fimilar gradations.
Were there no advantage to be reaped from thefe fiiudies, beyond the gratification of an in- nocent curiofity, yet ought not even this to be defpifed ; as being one accelTion to thofe few fafe and harmlefs pleafures, which are beflowcd on human race. The fweeteft and mofb inofienfive path of life leads through the avenues of fcience and learning} and whoever can either remove any obftruftions in this way, or open up any new profpefl, ought fo far to be efteemed a benefadtor to mankind. And though thefe refearches may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with fome minds as with fome bodies, which being endow- ed with vigorous and florid health, require fevere exercife, and reap a pleafure fram what, to the generality of mankind, may feem burdenfome and laborious. Obfcurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye ; but to bring light from obfcurity, by v/hatever labour, mud needs be delightful and rejoicing.
But this obfcurity in the profound and abftradV philofophy, is objefted to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable fource of uncer- tainty and error. Here indeed lies the juftefb and moft plaufible objection againft a confiderable part of metaphyfics, that they are not properly a fcience;
but
lo SECTION I.
but arife either from the fruitlefs efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into fubjedls ut- terly inacceflible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular fuperftitions, which, being unable to defend themfelves on fair ground, raife thefe intangling brambles to cover and proteft their weaknefs. Chafed from the open country, thefe robbers fly into the forefl:, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The ftouteft antagonift, if he remit his watch a moment, is opprefled. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with re- verence and fubmiffion, as their legal fovereigns.
But is this a fufficient reafon, why philofo- phers fhould defift from fuch refearches, and leave fuperftition ftill in poflTelTiGn of her retreat ? Is it not proper to draw an oppofite conclufion, and perceive the neceflity of carrying the war into the moll fecret recefles of the enemy ? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent difappoinment, will at laft abandon fuch airy fciences, and dif- cdvtT the proper province of human reafon. For, befides, that many perfons find too fenfible an intereft in perpetually recalling fuch topics ; be- fides this, I fay, the motive of blind delpair can never reafonably have place in the fciences j fince, however unfuccefsful former attempts may have proved, there is ftill room to hope, that the indiiftry, good fortune, or improved fagacity of fucceeding generations m.ay reach difcoveries un- known to former ages. Each adventurous genius^ will ftill leap at the^arduous prize, and find himfelf ftimulated, rather than dilcouraged, by the failures of his predecefibrsj while he hopes that the glory of archieving fo hard an adventure is referved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning,
at
or the Different Species of Philosophy, ii
at once, from thefe abftrufe queftions, is to en- quire ferioufly into the nature of human iinder- lianding, and fhew, from an exaft analyfis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for fuch remote and abftrufe fubje<5ts. We mull: fubmit to this fatigue, in order to Jive at eafe ever after : And mull cultivate true metaphyfics with fome care, in order to deftroy the falfe and adul- terate. Indolence, which, to fome perfons, af- fords a fafeguard againft this deceitful philofophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiofityj and def- pair, which, at fome moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to fanguine hopes and expe6tati- ons. Accurate and juft reafoning is the only ca- tholic remedy, fitted for all perfons and all difpo- fitions ; and is alone able to fubvert that abftrufe philofophy and metaphyfical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular fuperftition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to carelefs reafoners, and gives it the air of fcience and wifdom,
Befides this advantage of rejeding, after delibe- rate enquiry, the moft uncertain and difagreeable part of learning, there are many pofitive advanta- ges, which refult from an accurate fcrutiny into the powers and faculties of human nature. It is re- markable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though moft intimately prefent to us, yet, whenever they become the objeft of refiedion, they feem involved in obfcurity; nor can the eye readily find thofe lines and boundaries, which dif* criminate and diftinguifh them. The objedls are too fine to remain long in the fame afped or fitua- tion ; and muft be apprehended in an inftant, by a fuperior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconfiderable part of fcience barely to know the different operations of the mind, to feparate them from each other, to clafs them un- der their proper heads, and to corredall thatfeem-
ins:
12 SECTION I.
ing diforder, in which they lie involved, when made the objeft of refleftion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and diftinguifhing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to external bo- dies, the obje6ls of our fenfes, rifes in its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing ic. And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delinea- tion of the diftin6b parts and powers of the mind, it is at leaft a fatisfadlion to go fo far; and the more obvious this fcience may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible ftill muft the ignorance of it be efleemed, in all pre- tenders to learning and philofophy.
Nor can there remain any fufpicion, that this fcience is uncertain and chimerical j unlefs we fhould entertain fuch a fcepticifm as is entirely fubverfive of all fpeculation, and even adlion. It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with feveral powers and faculties, that thefe powers are diflinfl from each other, that what is really dif- tin<5t to the immediate perception may be diflin- guifhed by refle6lion ; and confequently, that there is a truth and falfehood in all propofitions on this fubjeft, and a truth and falfehood, which lie not beyond the compafs of human undcrftanding. There are many obvious diftincftions of this kind, fuch as thofe between the will and under Handing, the imagnation and paflions, which fall within the comprehenfion of every human creature; and the finer and more philofophical diftin6tions are no lefs real and certain, though more difficult to be com- prehended. Some inltances, efpecially late ones, of fuccefs in thefe enquiries, may give us a jufter notion of the certainty and folidity of this branch of learning. And ffiall we eftecm it worthy the labour of a philofopher to give us a true fyftem of the planets, and adjufl the pofition and order of
thofe
or the Different Species of Philosophy. iJ
thofe remote bodies; while we affect to overlook thofe, who, with fo much fuccefs, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are fo intimately concerned ?
But may we not hope, that pliilofophy, if culti- vated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its refearclies (till farther, and difcover, at leaft in fome degree, the fecret fprings and principles, by which the human mind is aduated in its operations ? Aftronomers had long contented themfelves with proving, from the phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magni- tude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philofopher, at laft, arofe, who feems, from the happiell reafon- ing, to have determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with i"egard to other parts of nature. And there is no reafon to defpair of equal fuccefs of our enquiries concerning the mental powers and oeconomy, if profecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be refolved into one more general and univerfal : And how far thefe refearches may poflibly be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by thofe who philofophize the mod negligently : And nothing can be more requifite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attenti- on; that, if it lie within the compafs of human un- derllanding, it may at laft be happily atchieved; if not, it may at laft be rejefted with fome confidence and fecurity. This laft conclufion, furely, is not defirable; nor ought it to be embraced too ralhiy. For how much muft we diminilh from the beauty and value of this fpecies of philofophy, upon fuch a fuppofition ? Moralifts have hitherto been accuf-
tomedj
14 S E G T I O N I.
tomed, when they confidered the vaft multitude 9.nd diverfity of thofe aftions that excite our appro- bation or diflike, to fearch for feme common prin- ciple, on which this variety of fentiments might depend. And though they have fometimes carri- ed the matter too far, by their pafTion for fome one general principle J it mull, however, be confefled, that they are excufable in expefting to find fome general principles, into which ail the vices and vir- tues were juftly to be refolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even poli- ticians : Nor have their attempts been wholly un- fuccefsful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring thefe fciences ftill nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretenfions of this kind may juftly be deemed more rafh, precipitate, and dog- matical, than even the boldeft and moft affirmative philofophy, that has ever attem.pted to impofe its crude dictates and principles on mankind.
What though thefe reafonings concerning human nature feems abftradl, and of difficult comprehen- lion ? This affords no prefumption of their falfe- hood. On the contrary, it feems impoffible, that what has hitherto efcaped fo many wife and pro- found philofophers can be very obvious and eafy. And whatever pains thefe refearches may coft usj we may think ourfelves fufficicntly rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleafure, if by that means, we can make any addition to our ftock of knowledge, in fubjefts of fuch unfpeakable im- portance.
But as, after all, the abflraclednefs of thefe fpe- culations is no recommendation, but rather a dif- advanc«ge to them, and as this difficulty may per- haps be furmounted by care and art, and the avoid- ing of all unnecelTary detail, we have, in the fol- lowing enquiry, attemj^ted to throw fome light up- ©n fubjeds, from which uncertainty has hitherto
deterred
Of the Different Species of Philosophy. 15
deterred the wife, and obfcurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different fpecies of philofophy, by reconciling pro- found enquiry with clearnefs, and truth with no- velty ! And ftill more happy, if, reafoning in this eafy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abftrufe philofophy, which feems to have hi- therto ferved only as a fhelter to fuperftition, and a cover to abfurdity and error !
( 17 )
SECTION II.
Of the Origin of Ideas.
E
VERY one will readily allow that there is a confiderable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of exi effive heat, or the pleafure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this fenfation, or anticipates it by his imagination. Thefe facul- ties may mimic ^ copy the perceptions of the fen- fesi but they ne\^er can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original fentiment. The utmoft we fay of them, even Vv^hen they operate v/ith great- eft vigour, is, that they reprefent their obje6l in fo lively a manner, that we could almoft fay we feel or fee it : But, except the mind be difordered by difeafe or madnefs, they never can arrive at fuch a pitch of vivacity, as to render thefe perceptions altogether undiftino-uifhable. All the colours of poetry, hov/ever fplendid, can never paint natural obje<fls in fuch a manner as to make the defcripti- on be taken for a real landfkip. The moll lively thought is ftill inferior to the dulleft fenfation.
We may obferve a like diftinftion to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emo- tion. If you tell me, that any perfon is in love, 1 eafily underftand your meaning, and form a juft conception of his fituationj but never can
Vol. II. C miftakc
i8 SECTION IL
iniftake that conception for the real diforders^ and agitations of the paflion. When We refledV, on our pad fentiments and affeftionsy our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objedts truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparifon of thofe in which our origi- nal perceptions v/ere clothed. It requires no nice difcernment or metaphyfical head to mark the diilinftion between them.
Here therefore we divide all the perceptions of the mind into two claffes or fpecies, which are diilinguillied by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The lefs forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The Other fpecies want a name in our language, and in moft others; I fuppofe, becaufe it was not requifite for any, but philofophical purpofes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, ufe a little ffeedom, and call them Impreffionsi employing that word in a fenfe fomewhat different from the ufual. By the term imprej/ion, then, I mean all our more lively per- ceptions, when we hear, or fee, or feel, love or hate, or defire, or will. And imprefTions, are dif- tinguifhed from ideas, which are the lefs lively perceptions, of which we are confcious, when we ref^eft on any of thofe fenfations or movements above mentioned.
Nothing, at firfl viev/, may feem more unbound- ed than t!ie thought of man, which not only ef- capes all human power and authority, but is not even reflraintd within the limits of nature and rea- lity. To form monfters, and join incongruous iliapes and appearances, cofts the invagination no more trouble than to conceive the mod natural and familiar objedts. And while the body is con- fined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain an J difficulty; the thougli't can in an inflant tranlport us into the moft diftant regions of the uni-
verfe;
or the O R re I N of Id E AS. 19
verfe; or even beyond the univerfe, into the un- bounded chaos, where nature is fuppofed to lie in total confufion. What never was feen, or heard of, may yet be conceived 3 nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what im- plies an abfolute contradiction.
But though our thought fecms to pofTefs this unbounded liberty, v/e ihall find, upon a rearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the fliculty of compounding, tranfpofing, augmenting, or di- minifhing the materials afforded us by the fen- i'es and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two confiftent ideas, gold, and mountain^ with which we were formerly ac- quainted. A virtuous horfe we can conceive; becaufe, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and fhape of a horfe, which is an animal familiar to us. In fhort, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outv/ard or inward fen- timent : The mixture and compofition of thefe belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to ex- prefs myfelf in philofophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impreffions or more lively ones.
To prove this, the two following arguments will, 1 hope, be fufficient. Firfl, when we ana- lyfe our thoughts or ideas, hov/ever compound- ed or fublime, we always find, that they refolve themfelves into fuch fimple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or fentiment. Even thofe ideas, which, at firfl: view, feem the moft wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer fcrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, v^'ife, and good Being, arifes from refiecling on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting,
C 2 without
cio SECTION It.
without limit, thofe qualities of goodnefs an'cl wifdom. We may profecute this enquiry to what length we pleafe; where we fliall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a fimilar imprefTion. Thofe who would alTert, that this pofition is not univerfally true nor with- out exception, have only one, and that an eafy method of refuting itj by producing that idea, w^hich, in their opinion, is not derived from this fource. It will be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doclrine, to produce the imprefliork or lively perception, which correfponds to it.
Secondly. If it happen, from a defe6t of the organ, that a man is not fufceptible of any fpecies of fcnfation, we always find, that he is as little fufceptible of the correfpondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours j a deaf man of founds. Reftore either of them that fenfe, in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his fenfations, you open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving thefe objects. The cafe is the fame, if the objeft, proper for exciting any fenfation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negroe has no notion of the reliih of wine. And though there are few or no inftances of the like deficien- cy in the mind, where a perfon has never felt or* is wholly incapable of a fentiment ar palTion, that belongs to his fpecies ; yet we find the fame obfer- vation to take place in a Icfs degree. A man of iTiild manners can form no idea of inveterate re- venge or cruelty; nor can a feliifli heart eafily con- ceive the heights of friendlhip and generofity. It is readily allowed, that other beings may polTefs many fenfes of which we can have no conception ; becaufe the ideas of them have never been intro- duced to us, in the only manner, by which an idea can have acccfs to the mind, to wit, by the adtual feeling and fenfation.
There
of the O R I G I N of I D E A S. 11
There is, however, one contradiftory phrenome- non, which may prove, that it is not abfolutely im- poiTible for ideas to arife, independent of their correfpondent imprefTions. I believe it will readi- ly be allowed, that the feveral diftinft ideas of -colour, which enter by the eye, or thofe of found, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the fame time, re- fembling. Now if this be true of different colours, it muft be no lefs fo of the different fhades of the fame colour; and each fliade produces a dif- tin6l idea, independent of the reft. For if this jfhould be denied, it is polTible, by the conti- nual gradation of ihades, to run a colour infenfi- bly into what is moft remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you cannot, without abfurdity, deny the extremes to be the fame. Suppofe, therefore, a perfon to ■have enjoyed his fight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular fliade of blue, for in- itance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different fhades of that colour, except that fingle one, be placed before him, def- cending gradually from the deepeft to the lighteftj it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that fhade is v/^anting, and will be fenfible, that there is a greater dillance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I 2i{k, whether it be poffible for him, from his own imagination, to fupply this deficiency, and raife up to himfelf the idea of that particular fliade, though it had never been conveyed to him b/ his fenfes ? I believe there are fev/ but will be of opi- nion that he can : And this may ferve as a proof, that the fimple ideas are not always, in every in- ftance, derived from the correfpondent impref- fions ; though this inftance is fo finaular, that it is fcarcely worth our obferving, and does not me- rit.
22 SECTION II.
rit, that for it alone we fhould alter our general maxim.
Here, therefore, is a propofition, which not only feems, in irfelf, firnple and intelligible 3 but, if a proper ufe were made of it, might render every difpute equally intelligible, and banifli all that jargon, v/hich has fo long taken poiTefiion of inetaphyfical reafonings, and drawn diigrace upon them. All ideas, efpecially abftracl ones, are na- turally faint and obfcure : The mind has but a {lender hold of them : They are apt to be con- founded with other refembling ideas ; and when we have often employed any term, though with- out a diltincl meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the contrary, all impreiTions, that is, all fenfations, either outward or inward, are ftrong and vivid ; The limits between them are more exactly deter- mined: Nor is it eafy to fall into any error or miftake with regard to them. When we enter- tain, therefore, any fufpicion, that a philofophi- cal term is emiployed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but en- quire, frc7n what impreffion is that Juppqfed idea derived? And if it be impoflible to aflign any, this will ferve to confirm our fufpicion. By bringing ideas into fo clear a light, we may rea- fonably hope to remove all difpute, which may arife, concerning their nature and reality*.
SECTION
See NOTE [A].
mu L' ivut 1 gyjuaauw
SECTION IIL
Of the ASSOCIATION of Ideas.
I
T is evident, that there is a principle of con- nexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mindj and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and re- gularity. In our more ferious thinking or dif- courfe, this is fo obfervable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tradt or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildefl: and mofl wan- dering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we fhall find, if we relleft, that the imagination .ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was llill a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which fucceeded each other. Were the loofeft and freeft converfation to be tranfcribed, there would immediately be obferved fomething, which connedled it in all its tranfitions. Or where this is wanting, the perlbn, who broke the thread of difcourfe, might ilill inform you, that there had fecretly revolved in his mind a fucceffion of thought, which had gradually led him from the fubjed of
converfation.
24 SECTION III.
convcrfation. Among different languages, even where we cannot fufpect the leaft connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, ex- prefTive of ideas, the moft compounded, do yet nearly correfpond to each other: A certain proof, that the fimple ideas, comprehended in the com- pound ones, were bound together by fome uni- verfal principle, which, had an equal influence on all mankind.
Though it be too obvious to efcape obferva- tion, that different ideas are connefted together i 1 do not find, that any philofopher has attempt- ed to enumerate or clafs all the principles of af- fociationj a fubjedl, however, that feems worthy 'of curiofity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, name- ly, Rejemblancej Contiguity in time or place, and Catife or Effe5i.
That thefe principles ferve to connefl ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A pidture na- turally leads our thoughts to the original * : The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or difcourfe concerning the others f : And if we think of a wound, we can fcarcely forbear refledting on the pain which fol- lows it J. But that this enumeration is compleat, and that there are no other principles of affocia- tion, except thefe, may be difficult to prove to the latisfa6lion of the reader, or even to a man's own fatisfa»5lion. All we can do, in fuch cafes, is to run over feveral inftances, and examine care- fully the principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never Hopping till we render the principle as general as poffible §. The
more
* Refemblance. f Contiguity. t Caufe and EfFeft.
§ For inllance. Contrail or Contrariety is alfo a connexion among Ideas : But it may, perhaps, be confidered as a mixture cf Cau/ation and Refemblance. Where two objeds are contra- ry.
I
Of the Association of Ideas. 25
niore inftances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more afiiirance fliall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is compleat and entire.
ry, the one deftroys the other ; that is, the caufe of its annihi- lation, and the idea of the annihilation of an objeft, implicB the idea of its former cxillence.
[ 27 ]
k
SECTION IV-
Sceptical Doubts concerning the Opera- tions of the Understanding.
PARTI.
,i\.LL the obje6ls of human reafon or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit. Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fa£l. Of the firft kind are the fciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic j and in fhort, every affirmati- on, which is either intuitively or demonftra- tively certain. That the Jquare of the hypothenufe is equal to the Jquare of the two fides , is a pro- pofition, which expreffes a relation between thefe figures. That three times five is eqiioj, to the half of thirty, expreffes a relation between thefe num- bers. Propofitions of this kind are difcovera- ble by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where exifbent in the univerfe. Though there never were a cir- cle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonflrat- ed by Euclid, would for ever retain their cer- tainty and evidence.
Matters of fa6t, which are the fecond objeds of human reafon, are not afcertained in the fame manner J nor is our evidence of their truth, hov/ever great, of a like nature with the forego- ing.
28 SECTION IV.
ing. The contrary of every matter of facft is flill pofiible ; becaufe it can never imply a con- tradi6tion, and is conceived by the mind with the fame facility and diftinclnefs, as if ever fo conformable to reality. 'That the Jim 'ujill not rife to-morrow is no lefs intelligible a propofiti- on, and implies no niore contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rije. We fhould in vain, therefore, attempt to demonftrate its falfehood. Were it demonilratively falfe, it u'ould imply a contradiftion, and could never be diftindtly conceived by the mind.
It miay, therefore, be a fubjeft worthy of cu- riofity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence, which affures us of any real exiftence and matter of faft, beyond the prefent teilimo- ny of our fenfes, or the records of our memo- ry, This part of philofophy, it is obfervable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns ; and therefore ou.r doubts and er- rors, in the profecution of fo important an en- quiry, may be the more excufable ; while we march through fuch difficult paths, without any guide or dired:ion. They may even prove ufe- fui, by exciting curiofity, and dellroying that implicit faith and fecurity, which is the bane of all reafoning and free enquiry. The difcove- ry of defetis in the common philofophy, if any fuch there be, will not, I prefume, be a dif- couragement, but rather an incitement, as is iifual, to attempt fomething more full and fa- tisfaftory, than has yet been propofed to the public.
All rcafonings concerning matter of fa<5t feem to be founded on the relation of Caujc and Ef- fetl. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and fenfes. If you were to afl< a man, wliy he believes any ijiatter of fad, which is abfent \ for inftancc,
that
Sceptical Dounrs. 29
that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reafon ; and this reafon would be fome other fad: ; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former refo- Jutions and promifes. A inan, finding a watch or any other machine in a dcfart ifland, would conclude, that there had once been men in that ifland. All our reafcnings concerning taft are of the fame nature. And here it is confl:antly fup- pofed, that there is a connexion between the prefent fci6t and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them togeriier, tiie inference would be entirely precarious. Thehear- ino; of an articulate voice and rational difcourfe in the dark afTures us of the prefence of fome perfon : Why ? becaufe thefe are the efFedts of the human make and fabric, are clofely con- nefted with it. If we anatomize all the other reafonings of this nature, we fhall find, that they are founded on the relation of caufe and eff^eCt, and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and lig-ht are colla- teral effects of fire, and the one etieft may juilly be inferred from the other.
If we would fatisfy ourfelves, therefore, con- cerning the nature of that evidence, which afTures us of matters of faft, we mufc enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of caufe and effedl.
I fhall venture to affirm, as a general propofiti- on, which admits of no exception, that the know- ledge of this relation is not, in any inftance, attained by reafonings a priori ; but arifes en- tirely from experience, when we find, that any par- ticular objedls are conftantly corjoined with each other. Let an objctl be prefented to a man of ever fo ftrong natural reafon and abilities j if that ob- jedt be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the mofb accurate examination 01 its fenfible qualities, to difcover any of its caufes or ef-
feds.
3d SECTION IV.
fe<fts. Adam, though his rational faculties be fuppofed, at the very firft, entirely perfedl, could not have inferred from the fluidity, and tran- fparency of water, that it would fuffbcate him, or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would confume him. No objeft ever difcovers, by the qualities which appear to the fenfes, either the caufes vv^hich produced it, or the ef- fefts which will arife from it ; nor can our reafon, unafllfted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real exigence and matter of fact.
This propofition, that canjes and effecfs are dif- coverable^ not by reafon, but by experience, will readily be admitted with regard to fuch ob- jedls, as we remember to have once been al- together unknown to us ; fince we muft be confcious of the utter inability, which we then lay under, of foretelling, what would arife from them. Prefent two fmooth pieces of marble to a man, who has no tincture of natural philo- fophy ; he will never difcover, that they will adhere together, in fuch a manner as to re- quire great force to feparate them in a dire(51: line, while they make fo fmall a refrllance to a lateral preflfure. Such events, as bear little analogy to the common courfe of nature, are alfo readily confefled to be known only by ex- perience ; nor does any man imagine that the explofion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadllone, could ever be difcove^-ed by argu- ments ^ priori. In like manner, when an ef- fect is fuppofed to depend upon an intricate ma- chinery or fecret fl:ru6ture of parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who will afiert, that he can give the ultimate reafon, why milk or bread is pro- per nourifliment for a man, not for a lion or a tyger ?
3 B^t
Sceptical Doubts. 31
'But the fame truth may not appear, at firfl: fight, to have the fame evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our firfl appearance in the world, which bear a clofe analogy to the whole courfe of nature, and which are fuppofed to depend on the fimple qualities of objedls, without any fecret ftruc- ture of parts. We are apt to imagine, that we could difcover thefe effe6bs by the mere opera- tion of our reafon, without experience. We fan- cy, that were we brought, on a fudden, into this world, we could at firft have inferred, that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulfe ; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pro- nounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of cuftom, that, where it is ftrongefb, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itfelf, and feems not to take place, merely becaufe it is found in the higheil de- gree.
But to convince us, that all the laws of na- ture, and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, fufHce. Were any objedl prefcnted to us, and were we requir- ed to pronounce concerning the effeft, which will refult from it, without confulting paft ob- fervation -, after what manner, I befeech you, muft the mind proceed in this operation ? It mufl in- vent or imagine fome event, which it afcribes to the objed as its effect ; and it is plain that this invention muft be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never pofTibly find the effedt in the fuppof- ed caufe, by the moft accurate fcrutiny and ex- amination. For the effect is totally different from the caufe, and confequently can never be difco- vered in it. Motion in the fecond Billiard-ball is a quite diftind event from motion in the
firfli
32 SECTION IV.
firjfl ; nor is there any thing in the one to fug- ged the fmallelt hint of the other. A ftone or piece of nietal raifed into the air, and left with- out any fupport, immediately falls : But to con- lider the matter a priori, is there any thing we difcover in this fituation, which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the ftone or metal ?
And as the firft imaofination or invention of a particular efFe£t, in all natural operations, is ar- bitrary, where we confult not experience ; fo muft we alfo cfteem the fuppofed tye or con- nexion between the caufe and efFed, which binds them together, and renders it impoffible, that any other efFeft could refult from the operati- on of that caufe. When I fee, for inftance, a Billiard-ball moving in a ftraight line towards ano- ther ; even fuppofe motion in the fecond ball fhould by accident be fuggefted ro me, as the re- fult of their contad or impulfe j may I not con- ceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that caufe ? May not both thefe balls remain at abfolute reft ? May not the firft^ ball return in a ftraight line, or leap off from the fecond in any line or diredion ? All thefe fup- pofitions are confiftent and conceivable. Why then fliould we give the preference to one, which is no more confiftent or conceivable than the reft ? All our reafoning a priori will never be able to ftiew us any foundation for this prefe- rence.
In a word, then, every effed is a diftind event from its caufe. It could not, therefore, be difco- vercd in the cayfe, and the firft invention or con- ception of it, a priori, muft be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is fuggefted, the conjundion of it with the caufe muft appear equally arbitrary; fince there are always many other effeds, which, to reafon, muft feem fully as confiftent and natu- ral.
I
Sceptical Doubts. 23
ral. In vain, therefore, ihould we pretend to de- termine any fingle event, or infer anv caufe or cC- feci, without the afliilance of obfervation and ex- perience.
Hence we may difcover the reafon, why no phi- lofopher, who is rational and modell, has ever pretended to afTign the ultimate caufe of any na- tural operation, or to fhow diftinftly the action of that power, which produces any fingle effecfl in the univerfe. It is confeffed, that the utmoil effort of human reafon is, to reduce the principles, productive of natural ph^Enomena, to a greater fimplicity, and to refolve the many particular ef- fects into a few general caufcs, by means of reafonings from analogy, experience, and obfer- vation. But as to the caufes of thefe general effects, we fliould in vain attempt their difcove- ly ; nor fhall we ever be able to fatisfy ourfelves, by any particular explication of them. Thefe ultimate fprings and principles are totally fhut up from human curiofity and enquiry. Elafti- city, gravity, cohefion of parts, communication of motion by impulfe ; thefe are probably the ultimate caufes and principles which we fliall ever difcover in nature ; and we may efteem ourfelves fufficiently happy, if, by accurate en- quiry and reafoning, we can trace up the par- ticular phcenomena to, or near to, thefe gene- ral principles. The mod perfecSl philofophy of the natural kind only ilaves off our ignorance a little longer : As perhaps the mod perfe6t phi- lofophy of the moral or metaphyseal kind ferves only to difcover larger portions of it. Thus the obfervation of human blindnefs and weaknefs is the refult of all philofophy, and meets us, at eve- ry turn, in fpite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.
Nor is geometry, when taken into the afTiftance ©f natural philofophy, ever able to remedy this
Vol. II. D defed,
34 SECTION IV'.
defe6l, or lead us into the knowledge of ulti- mate caufes, by all that accuracy of reafoningy for which it is fo juftly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the fup- pofition, that certain law^s are ellabiilhed by na- ture in her operations ; and abflraft reafonings are employed, either' to aiTiit experience in the difco- very of thefe laws, or to determine thdr influence in particular inftances, where it depends upon any precife degree of diftance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, difcovered by experience> that the moment or force of any body in mo- tion is in the compound ratio or proportion of its folid contents and its velocity : and confe- quently, that a fmall force may remove the greateft weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can encreafc the velocity of that force, fo as to make it an overmatch for its antagonill. Geo- m.etry adifts us in the application of this law, by giving us the juft dimenfions of all the parts and figures, which can enter into any fpecies of ma- chine; but flill the difcovery of the law itfelf is owing merely to experience, and all the ab- flradl reafonin2;s in the world could never lead us one ftep towards the knowledge of it. When we reafon a priori^ and confider merely any ob- je6l or caufe, as it appears to the aiind, indepen- dent of all oblervation, it never could fuggeft to us the notion of any diliin6l objefb, fuch as its effeft ; much lefs, fliew us the infeparable and inviolable connexion between them. A man muft be very fagacious, who could difcover by reafoning, that cryftal is the effed of heat, and ice of cold, without being previoufly acquaint- ed with the operation of thefe qualities.
PART
Sceptical Doubts. 35
P A R T II.
But we have not, yet, attained any tolerable fatisfaction with regard to the queftion firft: pro- pofed. Each folntion fiill gives rife to a new queftion as diflicult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther enquiries. When it is aficed, What is the nature of all our reajomngs concern- ing matter of fa£l ? the proper anfvv'er feems to be, that they are founded on the relation of caufe and effect. When again it is aiked. What is the foundation of all our reafonings and conclnfions concerning that relation? it in ay be replied in one word. Experience. But if we ftill carry on our fifting humour, and afk, What is the foundation of all conclnfions from experience ? this implies a new queftion, which may be of more difficult folu- tion and explication. Philofophers, that give them- felves airs of fuperior v/ifdom and fufficiency, have a hard tafl<:, when they encounter perfons of in- quifitive difpofitions, who pufli them from every corner, to which they retreat, and who are fure at laft to bring them to fome dangerous dilemma. The beft expedient to prevent this confufion, is to be modeft in our pretenfions ; and even to dif- cover the difncuky ourfelves before it is objett- ed to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.
I fhall content myfeif, in this fection, with an eafy talk, and fliall pretend only to give a ne- gative anfwer to the queftion here propofed. I fay then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of caufe and ePieft, our conclufi- ons from that experience are not founded on rea- foning, or any procefs of the underftanding. This anfwer we muil endeavour, both to explain and to defend.
D 2 It
.36 SECTION IV.
It mud certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great diftance from all her fecrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few fuperficial qualities of objeds; while flie conceals from us thofe powers and principles, on which the influence of thefe obje6ls entirely depends. Our fenfes inform us of the colour, weight, and con- fiflence of bread ; but neither fenfe nor reafon can ever inform us of thofe qualities, which fit it for the nouriihment and fupport of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the adlual motion of bodies ; but as to that, wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lofe but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the moft diftant conception. But notwithftanding this ignorance of natural powers * and principles, we always pre- fume, when we fee like fenfible qualities, tlwt they have like fecret powers, and expeft, that efi^efts, fimilar to thofe which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and confiflence with that bread, which we have for- merly eat, be prefented to us, we make no fcruple of repeating the experiment, and forefee, with certainty, like nourifliment and fupport. Now this is a procefs of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly "know the foundation. It is al- lowed on all hands, that there is no known con- nexion between the fenfible qualities and the fe- cret powers ; and confequently, that the mind is not led to form fuch a conclufion concerning their conflant and regular conjun6lion, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to pafl Ex- ^erienccj it can be allowed to give di7'e^ and cer- tain
* The word, Power, is here ufed in a loofeand popular fenfe. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evi- dence to this argument. Se Seft. 7.
Sceptical Doubts. 37
tain information of thofe precifc objcdls only, and that precife period of time, which fell under its cognizance : But why this experience fhoiild be extended to future times, and to other objedls, which for aught we know, may be only in ap- pearance fimilar ; this is the main queftion on which I would infill. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourilhed me^ that is, a body of fuch fenfible qualities was, at that time, endued with fecret powers: But does it follow, that other bread muft alfo nourifh me at another time, and that like fen- fible qualities muft always be attended with like fecret powers ? The confequence feems no wife ne- cefTary. At leall, it muft be acknowledged, that there is here a confequence drawn by the mind ; that there is a certain ftep taken ; a procefs of thought, and an inference, which wants to be ex- plained. Thefe two propofitions are far from be- ing the fame, / have found that Juch an ohjeSl has' always been attended with fuch an effect y and I fore^ fee, that other objects, which are, in appearance^ fimilar, will be attended with fimilar effects. I Ihall allow, if you pleafe, that the one propofition may juftly be inferred from the other: I know in facl» that it always is inferred. But if you infifl, that the inference is made by a chain of reafoning, I defire you to produce that reafoning. The con- nexion between thefe propofitions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw fuch an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reafoning and argument. What that medium is, I muft confefs, paflcs my apprehen- fion ; and it is incumbent on thofe to produce it, who affert, that it really exifls, and is the origia of all our conclufions concerning matter of fatt.
This negative argument muft certainly, in pro- cefs of time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philofophers fhall turn their t'nquiries this way j and no one be ever able
to
3
38 SECTION IV.
to difcover ;iny connefting propolition or interme- diate Hep, which fiipports the underdanding in this conclufion. But as the queilion is yet new, every reader may not truft fo far to his own pene- tration, as to conclude, becaufe an argument elcapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really exiit. For this reafon it may be requifite to venture upon a more difiicult tafK ; and enume- rating all the branches of human knowledge, en- deavour to flievv, that none of them can afford fuch an argument.
All reafonings may be divided into two kinds, namely demonfcrative reafoning, or that concern- ing relations of ideas, and moral reafoning, or that concerning matter of fa6t and exiftence. That there are no dcmonftrative arguments in the cafe, feems evident ; fince it implies no contradiction, that the courfe of nature may change, and that an obje6l, feemingly like thofe which we have ex- perienced, may be attended w^ith different or con- trary effeds. May I not clearly and diftindly conceive, that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other refpedts, refembles fnow, has yet the tafce of fait or feeling of fire ? Is there any more intelligible propofition than to af- firm, that all the trees will fiourilli in December and January, and decay in May and June ? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be diftindly con- ceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved f^ilfe by any demonftrative argument or abftrad reafoning a priori.
If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put truft in paft experience, and make it the ftan- dard of our future judgm.ent, thefe arguments muft be probable only, or fuch as regard matter of fad and real exiftence, according to the divifi- on above mentioned. But that there is no argu- ment of this kind, muft appear, if our explication of that fpccies of reafoning be admitted as folid
and
Sceptical Doubts. 39
and fatisfadory. We have faid, that all argu- ments concernino; exiftence are founded on the re- lation of caufe and efFcvit j that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience ; and that all our experimental conclufions proceed upon the fuppofition, that the future will be con- formable to the pafb. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this lail fuppofition by probable argu- ments, or arguments regarding exiftence, muft be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in quefbion.
In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the fimilarity, which we difcover among natural objedls,, and by which wc are induced to expect efFeCls fimilar to thofe, which we have found to follow from fuch objefts. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to difpute the .authority of experience, or to rejefl that great guid^ oi human life ; it may fiirely be allowed a philofopher to have fo inuch curiofity at leaft, as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to experiencej and makes us draw advantage from that fimilarity, which nature has placed among different obje£ls. From caufes, which appear fimilar^ we expert fimilar effeds. This is the fum of all our experi- mental conclufions. Now it fcems evident, that, if this conclufion were formed by reafon, it would be as perfect at firft, and upon one inftance, as after ever fo long a courie of experience. But the cafe is far otherwifj. Nothing fo like as eggs j yet no one, on account of fhis appear- ing fimilarity, expedts the fame tafte and relifii in all of them. It is only after a long courfe of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and fecurity with regard to a particular event. Now where is that pro- cefs of reafoning, which, from one infi:ance, draws a conclufion, fo different from that which
it
40 SECTION IV.
it infers from a hundred inflances, that are no- wife diiix-rent from that fingle one ? This quef- tion I prbpofe as much for the fake of infor- mation, as with an intention of raifing difficul- ties. I cannot find, 1 cannot imagine any fuch reafoning. But I keep my mind (till open to in- llru(ftion, if any one will vouchfafe to bellow it on me.
Should it be faid, that, from a number of uniform experiments, we bifer a connexion be- tween the fenfible qualities and the fecret pov/ers j this, I muft confefs, feems the fame difficulty, couched in different terms. The queftion ftill recurs, on what procefs of argument this infe- rence is founded ? Where is the medium, the in- terpofing ideas, which join propofitions fo very wide of each other ? It is confelTed, that tlie co- lour, confifbence, and other fenfible qualities of bread appear not, of themfelves, to have any con- nexion with the fecret powers of nourifliment and fupport. For otherwife we could infer thefe fe- cret powers from the firit appearance of thefe fen- fible qualities, without the aid of experience ; contrary to the fentiment of all philofophers, and contrary to pli?iii matter of faft. Here then is our natural ftate of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objefts. How is this re- medied by experience ? It only ffiews us a num- ber of uniform effeds, rcfulting from certain ob- jects, and teaches us, that thofe particular ob- jedts, at that particular time, were endowed with fuch powers and forces. When a new objedl en- dowed with fimilar fenfible qualities, is produc- ed, we expe6l fimilar powers and forces, and look for a like effetl. From a body of like colour and confiftence with bread, we expect like nouriffiment and fupport. But this furely is a Itep or progrefs of the niind, which wants to be explained. When a man fays, / have found,
in
Sceptical D o u n t s. 41
;/; nil pajl infianccs^ Juch Jcnfible qualities conjoined ivith Juch Jecret powers : And then he fays, Jimilar Jenfible qualities ivill always be conjoined zvith ftmilar fecret poivcrs ', he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are thefe propofitions in any refpecft the fame. You fay that the one propofition is an inference from the other. But you mull confefs that the in- ference is not intuitive j neither is it demonftra- tive : Of wliat nature is it then ? To fay it is ex- perimentaJ, is begging the queftion. For all infe- rences from experience fuppofe, as their foundati- on, that the future will refemble the paft, and that fimilar powers will be conjoined with fimi- lar fenfible qualities. If there be any fufpicion, that the courfe of nature may change, and that the pall may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes ufelefs, and can give rife to no inference or conclufion. It is impoilible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this re- femblance. Let the courfe of things be allowed hitherto ever fo regular j that alone, without fome new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue fo. In vain do you pretend ^to have learned the nature of bodies from your paft experience. Their fecret nature, and confequently all their eflcfts and inlluence, may change, without any change in their fenfible qua- lities. This happens fometimes, and with regard to fome objefts : Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objeds ? What logic, what procefs of argument fecures you againft this fup- pofition ? My praftice, you fay, refutes miy doubt. But you mifiake the purport of my queftion. As an agent, I am quite fatisfied in the point; but as a philofopher, who has fome fliare of curiofity, I will not fay fcepticifm, I want to learn the foun- dation of this inference. No reading, no enqui- ry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me fatisfaclion in a matter of fuch impor- tance.
42 SECTION IV.
tance. Can I do better than propofe the diffi- culty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have fmall hopes of obtaining a folution ? We fhall at leall, by this means, be fenfible of our igno- rance, if we do not augment our knov/ledge.
I mult confefs, that a man is guilty of unpar- donable arrogance, who concludes, becaufe an ar- gument has efcaped his own invefligation, that therefore it does not really exill. 1 muft alfo con- fefs, that though all the learned, for feveral ages, fhould have employed themfelves in fruitlefs fearch upon any fubje6t, it may Hill, perhaps, be rafh to conclude pofitively, that the fubject muft, therefore, pafs all human conprehenfion. Even though we examine all the fources of our know- ledge, and conclude them unfit for fuch a fub- je6l, there may ftill remain a fufpicion, that the enumeration is not compleat, or the exan^ination not accurate. But with regard to the prefent fub- jeft, there are fome confiderations, which feem to remove all this accufation of arrogance or fufpici- on of miftake.
It is certain, that the moft ignorant and ftupid peafants, nay infants, nay even brute be^s, im- prove by experience, and learn the qualities of na- tural objefls, by obferving the effects, which re- fult from them. When a child has felt the fen- fation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle i but will expeCt a fimilar efledt from a caufe, which is fimilar in its fenfible qualities and appearance. If you affert, therefore, that the underltanding of the child is led into this conclu- lion by any procefs of argument or ratiocinati- on, I may juilly require you to produce that argument -, nor have you any pretence to refufe fo equitable a demand. You cannot fay, that the argument is abflrufe, and may poffible ef- cape your enquiry ;. fince Vv^u contcfs, that it is
obvious
Sceptical Doubts. 43
obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hefitatc, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflec- tion, you produce any intricate or profound ar- gument, you, in a manner, give up the queftion, and confefs, that it is not reafonins; which eno;ao-es US to fuppofe the pad refembling the future, and to expedl fimil ir effcfts from caufcs, which are, to ajipearance, fimilar. This is tlie propofition which I intended to enforce in theprefent fetlion. If I be right, I pretendnot to have made any mighty difco- very. And if I be wrong, I mufl acknowledge myfelf to be indeed a very backward fcholar; Jlnce I cannot now difcover an argument, which, it feems, was perfectly familiar to me, long be- fore I v/as out of my cradle.
( 45 )
SECTION V.
Sceptical Solution of thcfe Doubts.
PART 1.
X HE paflion for philofophy, like that for re- ligion, feems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correftion of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by imprudent management, to fofter a predominant inclination, and pufli the mind, with more deter- mined refolution, towards that fide, which alrea- dy dra\xjs too much, by the biafs and propenfity of the natural temper. It is certain, that, while we afpire to the magnanimous firmnefs of the philofo- phic fage, and endeavour to confine our pleafures altogether within our own minds, we may, at lad, render our philofophy like that of Epidetus, and other StoicSy only a more refined fyftem of felfifh- nefs, and reafon ourfelves out of all virtue, as well as Ibcial enjoyment. While we Itudy with atten- tion the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and tranfitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, all the while, liattering our natural indolence, which, hating the buftle of the world, and drudgery of bufinefs, feeks a pretence of reafon, to give itfelf
a full
46 S E C T I O N V.
a full and uncontrouled indulgence. There is, however, one Ipecies of philofophy, which feems little liable to this inconvenience, and that becaufe it ftrikes in with no diforderly paffion of the hu- man mind, nor can mingle itfelf with any natural affeftion or propenfity ; and that is the Academic or Sceptical philofophy. The academics always talk of doubt and fufpenfe of judgment, of danger in hafty determinations, of confining to very nar- row bounds the enquiries of the underfiranding, and of renouncing all fpeculations which lie not v/ithin the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than fuch a philofophy to the fupine indolence of the mind, its ralli arrogance, its lofty pretenfions, and itc fuperftitious credulity. Every palTion is mortified by it, except the love of truth -, and that paffion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. It is furprifing, therefore, that this phi- lofophy, which, in almoft every inftance, muft be harmlcfs and innocent, fhould be the fubjeft of fo much groundlefs reproach and obloquy. But, per- haps, the very circumftance, which renders it fo innocent, is what chiefly expofes it to the public hatred and refentment. By flattering no irregular paffion, it gains few partizans : By oppofing fo ma- ny vices and follies, it raifes to itfeli abundance of en,emies, Avho ftigmatize it as libertine, pro- fane, and irreligious.
Nor need we fear, that this philofophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, fliouid ever undermine the reafonings of common life, and carry its doubts fo far as to deftroy all aftion, as well as fpeculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abflrad reafoning whatlbever. Though we fl^ould conclude, for inftance, as in the foregoing feftion, that, in all reafonings from experience, there is a ftep taken by the mind, which is not
fup-
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 47
fupported by any argument or procefs of the un- derllanding ; there is no danger, that thefe reafon- ings, on which ahnod all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by fuch a difcovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this llep, it mull be induced by fome other principle of equal weight and authority ; and that principle will preferve its influence as long as human na- ture remains the fame. What the principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry.
Suppoie a perfon, though endowed with the ftrongeft: faculties of reafon and ref^eclion, to be brought on a fudden into this world ; he would, indeed, immediately, obferve a a continual fuccef- fion of objecls, and one event follow another ; but he would not be able to difcover any thing farther. He would not, at firfl, by any reafoning, be able to reach the idea of caufe and efFed:; fince the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the fenles; nor is it reafbnable to conclude, . merely becaufe one event, in one inftance, precedes ano- ther, that therefore the one is the caufe, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and cafual. There may be no reafon to infer the exiftence of one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, fuch a perfon, without more experience, could never employ his conjec- ture or reafoning concerning any matter of ia6t, or be affured of any thing beyond what was imme- diately prefent to his memory and fenfes.
Suppofe again, that he has acquired more expe- rience, and has lived fo long in the world as to have obferved fimilar objefts or events to be con- Itantly conjoined together ; what is the confe- quence of this experience ? He immediately in- fers the exiftence of one obje6l from the appear- ance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of
the
4S S E C T I O N V.
the fecret power, by which the objeft produces the other ; nor is it, by any procefs of reafoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But ftill he finds himfelf determined to draw it : And though he fhould be convinced, that his underftandinor has no part in the operation, he v/ould never- thelefs continue in the fame courfe of thinking. There is fome other principle, which determines him to form fuch a conclufion.
This principle is Cuftom or Habit. For where- ever the repetition of any particular aft or opera- tion, without being impelled by any rcafoning or procefs of the underftanding ; we always fay, that this propenfity is the effeft of Cuftom. By em- ploying that word, we pretend not to have gi- ven the ultimate reafon of fuch a propenfity. "We only point out a principle of human na- ture, which is univerf.dly acknowledged, and which is well known by its effedts. Perhaps, we can puili our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the caufe of this caufe , but muft rcll con- tented with it as the ultimate principle, which •we can affign, of all our conclufions from expe- rience. It is fufficient fatisfaclion, that we can go fo far; without repining at the narrownefs of our faculties, becaufe they will carry us no farther. And it is certain we here advance a very intelli- gible propofition at lealt, if not a true one, v/hen we affert, that, after the conftant conjundtion of two objedts, heat and flame, for inftance, weight and folidity, we are determined by cuftom alone to expedl the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothefis fccms even the only one, which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thoufand inftances, an inference, which we are not able to draw from one inftance, that is, in no refpeft, different from them. Reafon is in- capable of any fuch variation. The conclufions, which it draws from confidering one circle, are
the
Sceptical Solutiov of thcfe Doubts. 49
the fame which it would form upon furveying all the circles in the univerfe. But no man, hav- ing feen only one body move after being im- pelled by another, could infer, that every other body will move after a like impulfe. All infer- ences from experience, therefore, are efFe<5ls of cuftom, not of reafonino; *.
Cufcom, then, is tlie great guide of human life. It is that principle alone, vvhich renders our experience ufeful to us, and makes us ex- pedl, for the future, a fimilar train of events with thole which have appeared in the paft. "Without the influence of cullom, we Ihould be entirely ignorant of every matter of faft, beyond what is immediately prefent to the memory and fenfes. We fhould never knov/ how to adjuft means to ends, or to employ our natural pow- ers in the produ6lion of any effedl. There would be an end at once of all a(5tion, as well as of the chief part of fpeculation.
But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclufions from experience carry us beyond our memory and fenfes, and affure us of matters of fa(5b, which happened in the moft dif- tant places and moft remote ages; yet fome fad: iiHift always be prefent to the fenfes or memo- ry, from whence we may firft proceed in draw- ing thefe conclufions. A man, who fliould find in a defert country the remains of pompous build- ings, would conclude, that the country had, in ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inha- bitants i but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form fuch an inference. We learn the events of former ages from hifto- ry ; but then we muft perufe the volumes, in which this inftruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one teftimony to Vol, II, E another,
* See NOTE [BJ.
50 S E C T 1 O N V.
another, till we arrive at the eye-witnefTes SncJ fpedators of thefe diftant events. In a word, if we proceed n^ot upon fome fad:, prefent to the memory or fenfes, our reafonings would be mere- ly hypothetical ; and however the particular links- might be connetled v/ith each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to fup- port it, nor could we ever, by its means, ar- rive at the knowledge of any real exiftence. If I afis;, vv'hy you believe any particular matter of fadt, which you relate, you muft tell me fome reafon ; and this reafon will be fome other fad, connefted with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitia-n.^ you mufl at laft terminate in fome fad:, which is prefent to your memory or fenfes ; or muft allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.
What then is the conclullon of the whole matter ; A fimple one j though, it muft be confefled, pret- ty remote from the common theories of philofo- phy. All belief of matter of fa6l or real exiftence is derived merely from fome objedt, prefent to the memory or fenfes, and a cuflomary conjunftion between that and fome other objeft. Or in other Words ; having found, in many inilances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, fnow and cold, have always been conjoined together ; if fiamc or fnow be prefcnted anew to the fenfes, the mind is carried by cuftom to expert heat or cold, and to believe^ that f .ch a quality docs ex- ift, and will difcover itfelf upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necellary refult of placing the mind in fuch circumftances. It is an operation of the foul, when we are fo fituated, as unavoidable as to feel the pailion of love, when we receive benefits i or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All thefe operations are a fpecies of natural in- ftincls, which noreafoning or procefs of the thought
anci
Sceptical Solution of chefe DciucTS. rf
and iinderftanding is able, cither to produce, or to prevent.
At this point, it would be very aliov/able for us to flop our philofophical refearches. In mod queftions, we can never make a fingle ilcp fartlier; and in all qucflions, we miiO; terininate here at laft, after our moft refrlefs and curious enquiries. But ftill our curiofity will be pardonable, per- haps commendable, if it carry us on to Itill far- ther refearches, and make us examine more accu- rately the nature oi' this hliefj znd o{ the cu/lo;na- ry conjun^ion^ whence it is derived. By this means we may meet with fome explications and anjlogies, that will give fatisfa6lion ; at leaft to fuch as love rhe abfl:ra(fi: fciences, and can be entertained with fpeculations, whicr,, however accurate, may ftill re- tain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different tafte ; the remaining part of this fe6lion is not calculated for them, and the fol- lowing enquiries may well be underllood, though it be negletled.
P A- R T II.
Nothing is more free than the imagination of man ; and though it cannot exceed that original Itock of ideas, furniihed by the internal and ex- ternal fenfes, it has unlimited pov/er of mixing, compounding, feparating, and dividing thefe ideas, in all the varieties of hction and vifjon. It can feign a train of events, v/ith all the appearance of reality, afcribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as exiltent, and paint rhem out to itfelf with every circumftance, that belongs to any hiftorical faft, which it believes with the crreateft certainty. Wnerein, tlierefore, con nils the differ- ence between fuch a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to fuch a conception as commands our alTent, and E 2 which
52 S E C T I O N V.
which is wanting to every known ficlion. For as- the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fidlion, and confequently be able to believe whatever it plcafes ; contrary to what we find by daily experi- ence. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horfe ; but it is not in our povi^er to believe, that fuch an animal has ever really exifted.
It follows, therefore, that the difference between fi^icn and belief lies in fome fentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be com- manded at pleafure. It mull be excited by nature, like all other fentiments j and mufb arife from the particular fituation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juntlure. Whenever any objedt is •prefented to the memory or fenfes, it immediately, by the force ofcuilom, carries the imagination to conceive that objed:, which is ufually conjoined to it ; and this conception is attended with a feeling or fentiment, different froni the loofe reveries of the fancy. In this ccnfifls the whole nature of be- lief. For as there is no matter of faft which we be- lieve fo firmly, that we cannot conceive the contra- ry, there would be no difiercnce between the con- ception affented to, and that which is rejecfled, were it not for fome fentiment, which diftinguilhes the one from the other. If I fee a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a fmooth table, I can cafily conceive it to ilop upon contact. This conception implies no contradidion j but ilill it feels very dif- ferently from that conception, by which I reprefent to myfelf the impulfe, and the communication of motion from one ball to another.
Were we to attempt a definition of this fentiment,
we ffiould, perhaps, find it very difficult, if not an
impoffible talk; in the fame manner as if we fiiould
endeavour to define the fcelmg of cold or paffion of
3 an^rer.
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 5j
anger, to a creature who never had any experience of thefe fentimenrs. Belief is tlic true and proper name of this feeling j and no one is ever at a lols to know the meaning of that term; becaufe every man is every moment confcious of the fentiment repre- fented by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a defcrvption of this fentiment; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at fome analogies, which may afford a more perfect explication of it. I fay then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, fteady conception of an ob- jedl, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may feem fo unphilofophical, is intended only to exprefs that a6t of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for fuch, more prefent to us than fi6lions, caufes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a fuperior influence en the pafTions and imagination. Provided we ag^'ee about the thing, it is needlefs to difpute about the terms. The ima- gination has the command over all its ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways poflible. It may conceive fiftitious obje6ls with all the circumftances of place and time. It may fet them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true colours, jufl: as they might have exifted. But as it is impofllble, that this faculty of imagination can €ver, of icfelf, reacii belief, it is evident, tiiat be- lief confiils not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in \kv^ manner of their conception, and in tht'w feeling to the mind. 1 confefs, that it is im- pofllble perfedly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. We may make ufe of words, which exprefs fomething near it. But its true and proper name, as we obferved before, is belief; which is a term, that every one fufficiently underfl:ands in common life. And in philofophy, we can go no farther than aflert, that belief is fomething felt by , the mindj which dillinguifhes the ideas of the judg- ment
54 S E C T I O N V.
ment from the fidions of the imagination. It gives them more weight and influence 3 makes them appear of greater importance ^ inforces them in the mind j and renders them the governing principle of our adions. I hear at prefent, for inllance, a perfon's voice, with whom I am acquainted ; and the found comes as from the next room. This im- preflion of my fenfes immediately conveys my thought to the perfon, together with all the fur- rounding obje(5i:s, I paint them out to myfelf a? exiiling at prefent, with the fame qualities and re- lations, of vv'hich I formerly knew them poifefTed. Thefe ideas take fader hold of my mind, than ideas of an enchanted caftle. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleafure or pain, joy or forrow.
Let us, then, take in the whole compafs of this doftrine, and allow, that the fentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intenfe and fteady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagina- tion, and that this manner of conception arifes from a cuflomary conjundlion of the object with fome- thing prefent to the memory or fenfes : I believe that it will not be difficult, upon thefe fuppofitions, to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up thefe phienomena to principles Hill ■more general.
We have already obferved, that nature has ella- blilTied connexions among particular ideas, and that no fooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and infenflble movement. Thefe principles of connexion oralTociation we have reduced to three, namely, Refemblance-, Conti^nityj and Caufation; v/hich are the only bonds, that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of refledion or difcourfe, which, in a greater or Icfs degree, takes place among all mankind.
Now
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 55
How here arifes a queftion, on which the folution of the prefenc difficulty will depend. Does it hap- pen, in all thefe relations, that, when one of the objefls is prefentcd to the fenfes or memory, the inind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a Headier and llronger con- ception of it than what otherwife it would have been able to attain ? This feems to be the cafe with that belief, which arifes from the relation of caufe and cffeft. And if the cafe be the fame with the other relations or principles of alFociation, this may be eflablifiied as a general law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind.
We may, therefore, obferve, as the firft expe- riment to our prefent purpofe, that, upon the ap- pearance of the pidture of an abfent friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the rejemblancey and that every paffion, which that idea occafions, whether of joy or forrow,- acquires new force and vigour. In producing this efFeft, there concur both a relation and a prefent imprefTion. Where the pidlure bears him no refemblance, at leall was not intended for him, it never fo much as conveys our thought to him : And where it is abfent, as well as the perfon j though the mind may pafs from the thought of the one to that of the other j it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that tranfition. We take a pleafure in viewing the picture of a friend, when it is let before us j but when it is removed, rather chufe to confider him direftly, than by reile6lion in an image, which i$ equally diftant and obfcure.
The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be confidered as inftances of the fame nature. The devotees of thatfuperftition ufually plead in ex- cufe for the mummeries, with which they are upbraid- ed, that they feel the good effeft of thofe external piotions, and poftures, and aftions, in enlivening
their
56 S E C T I O N V.
their devotion and quickening their fervour, which otherwife would decay, if direfted entirely to dif- tant and ini.naterial objedts. We fhadov/ out the objetts of our faith, fay they, in fenfible types and images, and render them more prefent to us by the immediate prefence of thefe types, than it is pofTi- ble for us to do, merely by an intelledual view and contemplation. Senfible objects have always a greater intiuence on the fancy than any other; and this influence they readily convey to thofe ideas, to which they are related, and which they refemble. I fhali only infer from thefe praftices, and this reafoning, that the effedl of refemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common ; and as in every cafe a refemiblance and a prefent impreffion mufc concur, we are abundantly fupplied with ex- periments to prove the reality of the foregoing prin- ciple.
Vv^e may add force to thefe experiments by others of a different kind, in confidering the effects of contiguity as well as of rejemhlance. It is certain, that diftance diminifhes the force of every idea, and that, upon our approach to any objecl; though it does not difcover itfelf to our fenfesj it operates upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an immediate impreffion. The thinking on any objedl readily tranfports the mind to what is contiguous s but it is only the a6lual prefence of an objeft, that tranfports it v/ith a fiiperior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me m.ore nearly than when I am two hun- dred leagues diftant ; though even at that diftance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter cafe, both the ob- jedls of the mind are ideas; notwithftanding there is an eafy tranfition between them ; that tranfition alone is not able to give a fuperior vivacity to any
of
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 57
of the ideas, for want of fome immediate imprcf- fion *.
No one can doubt but caiifation has the fame in- fluence as the other two relations of refemblance and contiguity. Superftitious people are fond of the reiiques of faints and holy men, for the fame reafon, that they feek after types or images, in or- der to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and ftrong conception of thofe exemplary jives, which they defire to imitate. Now it is evi- dent, that one of the beft reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a faint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be con- fidered in this light, it is becaufe they were once at hisdifpofal, and were moved and affected by him; in which refpeft they are to be confidered as imper- fe6l effcAs, and as connecfted with him by a fhorter chain of confequences than any of thofe, by which we learn the reality of his exiftence.
Suppofe, that the fon of a friend, who had been long dead or abfent, were prefented to us ; it is evident, that this objefl: would inftantly revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all paft intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours
than
• *' Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore qoo-
•' dam, ut, cum ea loca videainus, in quibus memoria dignos
'' viros accepeiimus multum efie verfaios, magis moveamur,
'' quam fiquando eorum ipforum aut fada audiamus aut fcrip-
*' turn aliquod Icgamus ? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit
" enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quern accepimus pri-
" mum hie difputare folitum : Cujus etiam illi hortuii propin-
" qui non memoriam folum mihi afterunt, fed ipfum viden-
<' tur in confpeftu meo hie ponere. Hie Speusippus, hie
" Xenocrates, hie ejus auditor Polemo ; cujus ipfa ilia
«' felBo iuit, quam videamus. Equidem etiam curiam nof-
" tram Hostilia.m dico, non hanc novam, quse mihi minor
" efle videtur poftquam ell major, folebam intuens, Scipio-
" NEM, Catonem, L^.lium, noftriim vcro in primis avum
" cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis eft in locis ; ut non fine
" caufa ex his mcmorias dedufta fit difciplina." CiCBRt
de Finilus. Lib»v.
85 S E C T I O N V.
than tliey would otherwife have appeared to us. This is a:u)ther phenomenon, which leems to prove the principle above-mentioned.
We may obferve, that, in thefe phasnomena, the belief of the correlative object is always prefup- pofed ; without vvhich the relation could have no efTcft. The influence of the pidure fuppofes, that we believe our friend to have once exiiied. Con- tiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unkTs we believe that it really exiils. Now I aflert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the me- mory or fenfes, is of a fimilar nature, and arifes from fimilar caufes, with the tranfition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguiflies the flame. This tranfition of thought from the caufe to the efi^ecl proceeds not from reafon. It derives its origin altos-ether from cuilom and experience. And as it firfl: begins from an object, prelent to the fenfes, it renders the idea or conception of flame more flirong and lively than any loofe, floating reverie of the imiagination. That idea arifes immediately. The thought moves in- ilantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the imprefli- on prefent to the fenfes. When a fvvord is levelled at my breafl:, does not the idea of wound and pain ftrike me more ftrongly, than when a glafs of wine i^ prefented to me, even though by accident this idea fliould occur after the appearance of the latter objed:? But what is there in this whole matter to caufe fuch a Itrong conception, except only a pre- fent objeft and a cufl:omary tranfition to the idea of another objedl, which we have been accufl:omed Xo conjoin with the former ? This is the whole ope- ration of the mind, in all our conclufions concern- ing matter of fad and exiltencc; and it is a fatif- fadion to find Ibmc analogies, by which it may be
explained.
Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 59
exphiined. The tranfition from a prefent object tlocs in all cafes give ftrength and folidity to the re- lated idea.
Here, then, is a kind of pre-eftablifl-ied harmo- ny between the coiirfe of nature and the fuccefTion of our ideas ; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly un- known to us ; yet our thoughts and conceptions have ftilj, we find, gone on in the fame train with the other works of nature. Cultom is that princi- ple, by which this correfpondence has been effedled; lb necelTary to the fubfillence of our fpecies, and the regulation of our condu6t, in every circumftance and pccurrence of human life. Had not the pre- fence of an object inftantly excited the idea of thofc objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our know- ledge mult have been limited to the narrow fphere of our memory and fenfes -, and we fhould never have been able to adjuft means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Thofe, who delight in the dif- covery and contemplation oi final caujesy have here ample fubject to employ their wonder and ad- miration.
I fhall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like efi'e6ts from like caufes, and vice verjuy is fo eflential to the fubfiftence of all hu- man creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trufted to the fallacious deductions of our reafon, which is flow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the firft years of infancy; and at belt is, in every age and period of human life, ex- tremely liable to error and miftake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wifdom of nature to fecure fo neceflary an a6t of the mind, by fome in- ftinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infal- lible in its operations, may difcover itfelf at the firft appearance of life and thought, and may be
independent
6o S E C T I O N V.
independent of all the laboured dedudions of the underftanding. As nature has taught us the ufe of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the mufcles and nerves, by which they are aduated ; {o has fhe implanted in us an inftinft, which carries forward the thought in a correfpondent courfe to that which fhe has eftablifhed among external ob- je6ls ; though we are ignorant of thofe powers and forces, on which this regular courfe and fucceflion of objed:s totally depends.
S E C-
( 6i ;
SECTION VI.
Of.PROBABILI TY*.
X HOUGH there be no fuch thing as Chance. in the world j our ignorance of the real caufe of any event has the fame influence en the un- derftanding, and begets a like fpecies of belief or opinion.
There is certainly a probability, which arifes. from a fuperiority of chances on any fide; and according as this fuperiority encreafes, and fur- pafles the oppofite chances, the probability re- ceives a proportionable encreafe, and begets fbill a higher degree of belief or aflent to that fide, in which we difcover the fuperiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of fpots on four fides, and with anothe*- figure or number of fpots on the two remaining fides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thou- fand fides marked in the fame manner, and only one fide diff'erent, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event
more
• Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonftrative and probable. In this view, we muft fay, that it is only probable all men muft die, or that the fun wiH rife to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common ufe, we ought to divide arguments into demonfirations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning fuch arguments from experience as leaye no room for doubt or oppoUtion.
62 S E C T I O N VI.
more fleady and fecure. This procefs of the thought or reafoning may feem trivial and ob- viousj but to thofe who confider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious fpe- culation.
It feems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to difcover the event, which may refulc from the throw of fuch a dye, it confiders the turning up of each particular fide as alike proba- ble; and this is the very nature of chance, to ren- der all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of Jides concur in the one event than in the other^ the mind is carried more frequently to the event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various pof- fibilities or chances, on which the ultimate refulc depends. This concurrence of feveral views irk one particular event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the fentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonifl, which is fupported by a fmaller number of views, and recurs lefs frequently to the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and flronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fiftions of the imagination, this operation may, perhaps, in fome meafure, be accounted for. The concurrence of thefe feveral views or glimpfes imprints the idea more ftrongly on the imagination; gives it fuperior force and vigour; renders its influence on the paffions and affeftions more fenfible; and in a word, begets that reliance or fecurity, which conllitutes the na- ture of belief and opinion.
The cafe is the fame with the probability of caufes, as with that of chance. There are fome c^ufes, which are entirely uniform and conftant in producing a particular eff»"d:, rnd no inftaiice has ever y^t been found of any Lilure or irregula- rity in their operation. Fire has always burned,
and
Of* Prob A B I L iTY. 6;;^
and water fuffbcated every human creature: The produiftion of motion by impulle and gravity is an univerial law, which has hitherto admitted of no exception. Rut there are other caufcs, which have been found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium a foporific to every one, who has taken thefe me- dicines. Jt is true, when any caufe fails of pro- ducing its ufual effeft, philofophers afcribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but fuppofe, that fome fecret caufes, in the particular Itrutture of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reafon- ings, however, and conclufions concerning the event are the fame as if this principle had no place. Being determined by cullom to transfer the part: to the future, in all our inferences; where the pafh has been entirely regular and uniform, we exped: the event with the greateft affurance, and leave no room for any contrary fuppofition. But where different effedls have been found to follow from caufes, which are to appearance exactly fimilar, all thefe various effefls muft occur to the mind in transferring the paft to the future, and enter into our confideration, when we determine the proba- bility of the event. Though we give the prefe- rence to that which has been found moft ufuaJ, and believe that this effe6l will exift, we mufl not overlook the other effefts, but muft alFign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or lefs frequent. It is more probable, in almoft every country of Europe, that there will be frofl fome- time in January, than that the weather will con- tinue open throughout that whole month ; though this probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it feems evident, chat, when we transfer the paft to the fu- ture, in order to determine the effetl, which will
refult
64 S E C T I O N VI.
refult from any caufe, we transfer all the different events, in the fame proportion as they have ap- peared in the paft, and conceive one to have ex- ifted a hundred times, for inftance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that fen- timent which we call beliefs and give its object the preference above the contrary event, vrhich is not fupported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not fo frequently to the thought in transferring the paft to the future. Let any one try to account for the operation of the mind up- on any of the received fyftems of philofophy, and he will be fenfible of the difficulty. For my part, I fhall think it fufficient, if the prefent hints ex- cite the curiofity of philofophers, and make them fenfible how defedlive all common theories are in treating of fuch curious and fuch fublime lubje6V$,
SEC-
( 65 )
SECTION VII.
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. PART I.
X
HE great advantage of the mathematical fciences above the moral confifts in this, that the ideas of the former, being fenfible, are al- ways clear and determinate, the fmallell diiliinc- tion between them is immediately perceptible, and the fame terms are ftill expreffive of the fame ideas, v/ithout ambiguity or variation. An oval is never miftaken for a circle, nor an hy- perbola for an ellipfis. ' The ifofceles and fcaienum arediftinguiflied by boundaries more exa6t than vice and virtue, right and wrong. If any term be de- fined in geometry, the mind readily, of itfelf, fubftitutes, on all occafions, the definition for the term defined: Or even when no definition is em- ployed, the objett itfelf may be prefented to the fenfes, and by that m.eans be fteadily and clear- ly apprehended. But the finer fentiments of the mind, the operations of the underftanding, the various agitations of the paflions, though really in themfelves diftinft, eafily efcape us, when fur- veyed by refledlion ; nor is it in our power to re- cal the original object, as often as we have occa- fion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our reafonings: Simi- VoL, IL' F lar
66 SECTION Vir.
lar obje£ls are readily taken be to the fame: And; the conclufion becomes at lad very v/ide of ther premifes.
One may fafely, however, affirm, that if we con- fider thefe fciences in a proper light, their advan- tages and difadvantages nearly compenfate each other, and reduce both of them to the ftate of equality. If the mind, v/ith greater facility, re- tains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate,, it muft carry on a much longer and more intri- cate chain of reafoning, and compare ideas moch' wider of each other, in order to reach the abiLru- fer truths of that fcience. And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme care, to fall into obfcu- rity and confufion, the inferences are alv/ays much fhortef in thefe difquifitions, and intermediate fteps^ \Vhich lead to the- concufion, much fewer than in the fciences which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is fcarccly a propofition in Euclid fo fimple, as not to confift of more parts, than are to be found in any moral reafoning which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind though a few ileps, we may be very well fatisfied with our pro- grefs; confidering how foon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning caufes, and redu- ces us to an acknowjedcrment of our i^rnorance.. The chief obftacie, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or m.etaphyfical fciences is the obfcu- rity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compafs of tliought, requifite to the forming of any conclufion. And, perhaps,, our progrefs in natural phiioi'ophy is chiefly re- tarded by the want of proper experiments and pha?- nomena, which are often difcovered by chance, and cannot always be found, when requifite, even by the mod ciiligent and prudent enquiry. As moral philofopiiy feems hitherto to have received'
kfs
Of* the Idea of Necessary Connexio!-j. 67
lefs improvement than either geometry or phyfics, we may conclude, that, if there be any difference in this refpeft among thcfe fciences, rhe difficul- ties, which obftruch the progrefs of the former, require fuperior care and capacity to be farmount- ed.
There are no ideas, which occur in metaphyfics, more obfcure and uncertain, than thofe of fowery force, energy, or necejfary connexion, of which it is every moment necelTiiry for us to treat in all our difquifitions. We lliall therefore, endeavour, in this fcClion, to fix, if poilible, the precife mean- ing of thefe terms, and thereby remove fome part of that obfcurity, which is fo much complained of in this fpecies of philofophy.
It fecms a proportion, v/hi,:h will not admit of much dil'pute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our imprelTions, or, in other words, that it is impolTible for us to think of any thing, which we have not antecedently feli, either by our ex- ternal or internal fenfes. 1 have endeavoured * to explain and prove this proportion, and have ex- prelTed my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a-greater clearnefs and pre- cifion in philofophical reafonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well 'known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of thole parts or fimple ideas, that compofe them. But when v.'e have puHied up definicions to the moil fimple ideas, and find ftill fome ambiguity and obfcurity; what refource are v/e then polfefTed of? By what inven- tion can we throw light upon thefe ideas, and ren- der them altogether precife and determinate to our intelledlual view? Produce the imprefHons or original fentirrents, from which the ideas are co- pied. Thefe imprefTions are all flrong and fen-
F 2 fible.
* Secllon II,
6S S E C T 1 a N VIL
fible. They abmit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themfelves, bur may throw light on their correfpondent ideas, which lie in obfcurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microfcope or fpecies of optics, by which, in the moral fciences, the moft minute, and mDll: fimple ideas may be fo enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehenfion^ and be equally known with the groflcft and moft fenfible ideas, that can be the objedl of our in- quiry.
To be fully acquainted^ therefore, with the idea* ©f power or neceffary connexion, let us examine its imprefnonj and in order to find the imprelTion with greater certainty, let us fearch for it in all- the fources, from which it may polTibly be derived.
When we look about us towards external ob- jects, and confider the operation of caufes, we are never able, in a fingle infbancc, to difcover any power or n^ceiTary connexions, any quality, which, binds the effefl toy the caufe, and renders the one an infallible confequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fa6l, follow the other. The implufe of one billiard-ball is at- tended with motion in the fecond. This is the whole that appears to- the outward fenfes. The mind feels no fentiment or inward imprelTion from this fuccelTion of objecls: Confequencly, there is- not, in any fingle particular inflance of caufe and cfFecft, any thing which can fuggeil the idea of power or neceflary connexion.
Prom the firft appearance of an objeft, whene- ver can conjecfbure what effecl will relult from it. But were the power or energy of any caufe difco- verable by the mind, we could forefee the effedt, even without experience; and might, at firfl, pro- nounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere 4iint of thought and reafoning.
In reality, there is no part of matter^ that does
evcT;^-
I
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 69
ever, by its fenfible qualities, difcover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it ■could produce any thing, or be followed by any other objecl, which we could denominate its ef- fcft. Solidity, extenfion, motion; thefe qualities are all complete in themfelves, and never point out any other event which may refult from them. The fcenes of the univerfe are continually fliifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted luccefTionj but the power or force, which aftuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never difcovers itfelf in any of the fenfible qualities of body. We know, that, in faft, heat is a conftant attendant of flame i but what is the connection between them, we have no room fo much as to conje6lure or imagine. It is impof- fible, therefore, that the idea of power can be de- rived from the contemplation of bodies, in fingle inftances of their operation; becaufe no bodies €ver difcover any power, which can be the origi- nal of this idea*.
Since, therefore, external objedls as they appear to the fenfes, give us.no idea of power or necefTa- ry connexion, by their operation in particular in- ftances, let us fee, whether this idea be deriv- ed from reflcftion on the o'^cracions of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impref- fion. It may be faid, that we are every moment confcious of internal power; while we feel, that, by the fimple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An aCl of volition produces motion
in
* Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, fays, that, finding from experience, that there are feveral new produdlions in matter, and concluding that there rnuft fomewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at laft by this reafoning at the idea of power. But no reafoning can ever give us a new, original, fimple idea; as this philofopher himfelf confeiTes, This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.
70 SECTION VII.
in our limbs, or raifes a new idea in our imagi- nation. This influence of tlie will we know by confcioufners. Hence we acquire the idea of pow- er or energy; and arc certain, that we ourfelves and all other intelligent beings are poflefled of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflefcion, lince it arifes from refieding on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is ex- ercifed by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the foul.
We flialj proceed to examine this pretenfion; and firll with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence, we may obferve, is a faft, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be forefcen from any apparent energy or power in the caufe, which connects it with the effedlj and renders the one an infallible confequence of the other. The motion of our body follov/s up- on the command of our v/ill. Of this vv'e are eve- ry moment confcious. But the means, by which this is effefted ; the energy, by which the will per- forms fo extraordinary an operation; of this we are fo far from being immediately confcious, that it muft for ever efcape our mofc diligent enquiry.
Vox firft; is there any principle in all nature more myfterious than the union of foul with body; by which a fuppofed fpiritual fubftance acquires fuch an influence over a material one, that the mod refined thought is able to a6tuate the grofleft matter ? Were we empowered, by a fecrec wifh, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extenfive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our com- prehenfion. But if by confcioufnefs wc perceived any power or energy in the will, we muil know this power; we mufl know its connexion with the efi-e6t ; we rnull know the fecret union of foul and body, and the nature of both thefe fubftances;
by
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, 71
by whrch the one is able to operate, in fo many inflances, upon the other.
Secondly^ We are not abie to move all the or- gans of the body with a like authority; though v.'e cannot affign any reafon befides experience, for fo remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the will an influence over the tonf]j'je and finders, not over the heart or iiver ? This qiieftion would never cmbarrafs lis, were we confcious -of a power in the former cafe, not in the latter. We fhould then perceive, inde- pendent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumfcribed. within fuch particular limits. Being in than cafe fully acquainted with the power or force, by v/hich it operates, v.'e fliould alfo know, why its influence reaches precifely to fuch boundaries, and no farther.
A man, fuddenly ftruck with a palfy in the leg or arm, or who had newly loft thofe members, fre- quently -endeavours, at firft, to move them, and employ them in their ufual oiHces. Here he is as much cor-ifcious of power to command fuch limbs, as a man in perfeft health is confcious of power to ^.vftuate any member which remains in its natural Itate and condition. But confcioufnefs never de- ceives. Confequently, neither in the one cafe nor in the other, are we ever confcious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how one event confequently follows another ; v/ithout inflrutling us in the fecret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them in- feparable.
1'hirdly^ We learn from anatomy, that the imme- diate objefb of power in voluntary motion, is not the member itfelf which is moved, but certain mufcles, and nerves, and animal fpirits, and, perhaps, fome- t-hing ftill more minute and more unknown, through
v/hich
72 SECTION VII.
which the motion is fucceffively propagated, ere it reach ere it reach the member itfelf whofe motion is the immediate obje6l of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation is performed, fo far from being direclly and fully known by an inward fentiment or confcioufnefs, is, to the laft degree, my[lerioas and unintelligible ? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately another event, tinknown to ourfelves, and totally diffe- rent from the one intended, is produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: Till at laft, through a long fucccfilon, the defired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it muft' be known : Were it known, its efieft muft: aifo be known j fincc all power is relative to its efFedl. And vice verfa, if the effeft be not known, the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be confcious of a power to remove our limbs, when we have no fuch power; but only that to move certain ani- mal Ipirits, which, though they produce at laft the motion of our limbs, yet operate in fuch a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehenfion ?
We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without any temerity, though with aflu- rancej that our idea of power is not copied from any fentiment or confcioufnefs of power within ourfelves, when we give rife to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper ufe and of- fice. That their motion follows the command of the v/ill is a matter of common experience, like other natural events : But the power or energy by which this is effefled, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable *.
Shall we then aflert, that we are confcious of a power or energy in our own minds, when, by an ai^or command of our will, we raife up a new idea,
fix * See NOTE [CJ.
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 73
fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all fidei-, and at hdl diiiiiifb it for fome other idea, when we think that we have furveyed it with fufficient accuracy? I believe the fame ar- guments vsill prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.
Firjiy It muft be allowed, that, when we know a power, we i:now that very circumRance in ihe caufe, by which it is enabled to produce the ef- fcifl: For thefe are fuppofed to b^ fynonimous. We muft, therefore, know both the caufe and etfc<5t, and the relation between them. But do -we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human foul and the nature of an idea, or the apti- tude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation; a produftion of fomething out of nothing: Which implies a power fo great, that it may feem, at firll fight, beyond the reach of any being, lefs than infinite. At leaft it mull be owned, that fuch a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceiv- able by the mjnd. We only feel the event, name- ly, the exillence of an idea, confequent to a com- mand of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed ; the power, by which it is produced; is entirely beyond our comprehenfion.
Secondly^ The command of the mind over it- felf is limited, as well as its command over the body; and thefe limits are not known by reafon, or any acquaintance with the nature of caufe and efFecc; but only by experience and obfervation, as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objecls. Our' authority over our fen- timents and pafiions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumfcribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to afTign the ultimate reafon of thefe boundaries, or fliow why the power is de- ficient in one cafe, not in another ?
Thirdly, This felf-command is very dijfiferent at different times. A man in health polTeiTes
more
74 SECTION VII.
more of it, than one languiHiing with ficknefs, "We are more mafter of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: Failing, than af- ter a full meal. Can we give any reafon for thefe variations, except experience ? V/here then is the pov/er, of which we pretend to be confci- oiis ? Is there not here, either in a fpiritiial or material fubftance, or both, feme fecrct mecha- nifim or ftriifture of parts, upon which the ef- fect depends, -and which, being entirely unknov/n to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknov»'n and incomprehenfjble ?
• Volition is furely an aft of the mind, with which we are fufficienr'y acquainted. Refieft upon it. Confider it on all fides. Do you find vny thing in it like this creative power, by which it raifes from nothing a new idea, and with 2 kind of Fiat, imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed fo to fpeak, who called forth into exiftence all the various fcenes of nature ? So far from being conicious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience, as that of which we are poffefTed, to convince us, that fuch extra- ordinary efFeds do ever refult from a firnple a6l of volition.
The generality of manking never find any dif- ficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature; fuch as the defcent of heavy bodies, the grov/th of plants, the gene- ration of animals, or the nouriihment of bodies by food : But fuppofe, that, in all thefe cafes, they perceive the very force or energy oi the caufe, by which it is conne6led with its c{- i'ccty and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the caufe, they immediately expedt with affurance its ufual at- tendant, and hardly conceive it poflible, that any other event could refult from it. It is on- ly on the difcovery of extraordinary phceno-
mcna.
of th^ Idea of Necessary Connexion. 7^
rnena, fuch-as earthquakes, pcftilence, and prodi- gies of any kind, that they find themfelves at a iofs to aliign a proper caufe, and to explain the manner, in which the effc(5l is produced by it. It is iilual for men, in fuch difficulties, to have recourle to Ibme inviGblc intelligent principle*, as the immediate caufe of that event, which fur- prifes them, and which they think, cannot be ac- counted for from the common powers of nature. But philofophcrs, who carry their fcrutiny a little farther, iiVimediaeely perceive, that, even in the mod familiar events, the energy of the caufe is as unintelligible as in the mofb unufual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent Con- jun(5i:ion of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like Connexion between them. Here then, many philoibphers think them- felves obliged by reafon to have recourfe, on all occafions, to the fame principle, which the vul- gar never appeal to but in cafes, that appear miraculous and fupernatural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the ulti- inate and orio-inal caufe of all things, but the immediate and fcle caufe of every event, which appears in nature. They pretend, that thofe ob- jeds, which are commonly denominated caiijes, are in reality nothing but occafions \ and that the true and dire£l principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who v/ills, that fuch particular objecfts fliould, for ever, be conjoined with each other. Inftead of faying, that one billiard-ball moves another, by a force, which it has derived from the author of nature ; it is the Deity him- felf, they fay, who, by a particular volition, moves the fecond ball, being determined to this ope- ration by the impulfe of the firft ball j in confe- quence of thofe general laws, which he has laid
down
* 0Si^ CCTTO ^T^<i,n;^
76 SECTION VII.
down to himfelf in the government of the univeiTe. But philoJbphers advancing flili in their enquiries, difcover, that, as we are toZ3.\\y ignorant of the power, on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no lefs ignorant of that power, on which depends the operationof mind on bo- dy, or of body on mind ; nor are we able, ei- ther from our fenfes or confcioufnefs, to affign the ultimate principle in one cafe, more than in the other. The fame ignorance, therefore, redu- ces them to the fame conclufion. They aflcrt, that the Deity is the immediate caufe of the union be- tween foul and bodyj and that they are not the organs of fenfc, which, being agitated by exter- nal objedfts, produce fenfations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites fuch a feniation, in confe- quence of fuch a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will, in the will, that produces local motion in our mem- bers : It is God himfelf, who is pleafed to fe- cond our will, in itfelf impotent, and to com- mand that motion, which we erroneoufly attri- bute to our own power and efRcacy. Nor do philofophcrs Hop at this conclufion. They fome- tim.es extend the fame inference to the mind it- felf, in its internal operations. Our mental vifk- on or conception of ideas is nothing but a revela- tion made to us by our Maker. When we volun- tarily turn our thoughts to any objeft, and raife up its image in the fancy; it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the univerfal Crea- tor, who difcovers it to the mind, and renders it prefent to us.
I'hus, according to thefe philofophcrs, every thing is full of God. Not content with the prin- ciple, that nothing exifts but by his will, that nothing j)oire(res any power but by his concef-
fion :
of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 77
fion: They rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their depen- dence on the Deity Itill more fcnfible and imme- diate. They confider not, that, by this theory, they diminifh, inftead of magnifying, the gran- deur of thofe attributes, which they affed fo much to celebrate. It argues furely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures, than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition. It argues more wif- dom to contrive at firll the fabric of the world with fuch perfedl forefight, that, of itfelf, and by its proper operation, it may ferve all the purpo- fes of providence, than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjufl its parts, and ani- mate by his breath all the wheels of that ftupen- dous machine.
But if we would have a more philofophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two fol- lowing refiediions may fuffice.
Firj}^ It feems to me, that this theory of the univerfal energy and operation of the Supreme Being, is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, fufficiently apprized of the weaknefs of human reafon, and the narrow limits, to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were ever fo logical, there muft arife a flrong fufpi- cion, if not an abfolute aflurance, that it has car- ried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclufions fo extraordinary, and fo remote from common life and experience. We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the laft fteps of our theory; and there we have no reafon to trud our common methods of argument, or to think that our ufual analo- gies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too Ihort to fathom fuch immenfe abyfles. And however we may flatter ourfelves, that we are guided, in every Hep which we take, by a kind
of
78 SECTION Vll.
of verifimilitude and experience; we way be af- fured, that this fancied experience has no authority, when we thus apply it to fubjefts, that lie en- tirely out of the fphere of experience. But on this we Ihall have occafion to touch afterwards*. Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the ar- guments, on which this theory is founded. Wo. are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each other : Their force or ener- gy is entirely incomprehenfible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind, even the fupreme mind, operaces either on itfelf or on body ? Whence, I befeech you, do we acquire any idea of it ? We have no fentiment or confcioufnefs of this power in ourfelves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from refiedlion on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reafon for rejed- ing any thing, we fhould be led into that princi- ple of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grof^ell matter. We furely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more difficult to conceive, that motion may arife from impulfe, than that it mav arife from volition ? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cafes -j-.
P A R T II.
But to haflen to a conclufion of this argu- ment, which is already drawn out to too great a length : W^e have fought in vain for an idea of power or neceffiry connexion, in all the four- ces from which we could fuppofe it to be de- rived. It appears, that, in fingle inftances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our iitmoft fcrutiny, difcover any thing but one ^v^nt following anotheri without being able to compre- hend • Seaion xir.
t See NOTE [D].
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 79
hend any force or power, by which the caufe ope- rates, or any connexion betv/een it and its fup- pofed effe<fl:. The fame difficulty occurs in con- templaiting the operations of mind on body; where we obferve the motion of the latter to fol- low upon the volition of the former j bnt are not able to obferve or conceive the tye, which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this eflx^cl. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is rot a v/hit more comprchcnfible : So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout: all nature, any one inftance of connexion, which is conceivable by us. All events feem entirely loofe and feparate. One event follows another; but v;e never can obferve any tye between them. Th^y feem conjoined^ but never connc5fcd. And as v/e can have no idea of any tlhing, which never appeared to our outward fenfe or inward fenti- ment, the necelTary conclufion feems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that thefe words are abfolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philofophicai leafonings, or common life.
But there ftill remains one method of avoid- ing this conclufion, and one fource which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or event is prefented, it is impoffible for us, by any fagacity or penetration, to difcover, or even con- jedlurc, without experience, what event will refalt from it, or to carry our forefight beyond that objed, wliich is immediately prefent to the me- mory and fenfes. Even after one inftance or ex- periment, where we have obferved a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entit- led to form a general rule, or foretel what will happen in like cafes; it being juftly efteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole courfe of nature from one fingle experiment, how- ever
So SECTION VII.
ever accurate or certain. But when one parti- cular fpecies of event has alv/ays, in all inftan- ces, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any fcruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reafonin^, which can alone afTure us of any mat- ter of fact or exiftence. We then call the one objedl, Cauje\ the other, Effe5i. We fuppofe, that there is fome connexion between them; fome power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greateft certain- ty and ftrongeft neceffity.
It appears, then, that this idea of a neceffary con- nexion among events arifes from a number of fimilar infbances, which occur, of the conftant con- junction of thefe events ; nor can that idea ever be fuggefted by any one of thefe inflances, fur- veyed in all polTible lights and pofitions. But there is nothing in a number of inflances, dif- ferent from any fingle inftance, which is fuppofed to be exadtly fimilar; except only, that after a repetition of fimilar inftances, the mind is car- ried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expeft its ufual attendant, and to believe, that it will exift. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this cuftomary tranfition of the im.agination from one objedt to its ufual at- tendant, is the fentiment or impreffion, froiTi which we form the idea of power or neceffary connexion. Nothing farther is in the cafe. Con- template the fubjedl on all fides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the fole difference between one inftance from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of fimilar inflances, by which it is fuggefted. The firfl time a man law the com- munication of motion by impulfe, as by the fhock of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was conne^ed: but only that it was
conjoined
of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 8i
conjoined with the other. After he has obferved feveral inftances of this nature, he then pronoun- ces them to be connecied. What alteration has happened to give rife to this new idea of con- nexion'^ Nothing but that he now feeU thefe events to be conne^ed in his imagination, and can readi- ly foretel the fxiftence of one from the appear- ance of the other. When we fay, therefore, that one objett is connected with another, we mean only, that tJiey have acquired a connexion in our •thought, and give rife to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's exifcence : A conclufion, which is fomewhat extraordinary^ but which feems founded on fufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gene- ral diffidence of the underftanding, or fceptical fufpicion concerning every conclufion, which is new and extraordinary. No conclufions can be more agreeable to fcepticifm than fuch as make difcoveries concerning the weaknefs and narrow limits o{ human reaion and capacity.
And what ftrong-er indance can be produced of the furprifing ignorance and weaknefs of the un- derftanding, than theprefent? For fu rely, if there be any relation among objects, which it imports us to know perfectly, it is caufe and effe6l. On this are founded all cur reafonings concern- ing matter of fact or exiftence. By means of it alone we attain any afTurance concerning obje6ts, which are removed from the prefent teftimony of our memory and fenfes. The only immediate utility of all fciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their cau- fes. Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore, every moment, employed about this relation : Yet fo imperfeft are the ideas which we form con- cerning it, that it is impofUble to give any juft definition of caufe, except what is drawn from fomething extraneous and foreign to it. Similar
Vol. II. G objeds
82 SECTION VII.
obje£ts are always conjoined with fimilar. Of this "Vve have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a caiue to be an obje^y fol- lowed by an other J and zvhere all the objecfSyJimilar to the frjly are foUozved by oujeSis fimilar to the Jecond. Or in othiir words, where^ if the firfi objetf had not been, the fecond never had exijied. The appear- ance of a caule alvv^ays conveys the mind, by a cuf- tomary tranfition, to the idea of the effed:. Of this alfo we have experience. We may, there- fore, fuitably to this experience, form another definition of caufe j and call it, an object followed by another, and whoje appearance ahvays conveys the thought to that other. But though both thefe definitions be drav/n from circumftances foreign to the caufe, v/e cannot remedy this inconveni- ence, or attain any m.ore perfefl definition, which may point out that circumllance in the caufe, which gives it a connexion with its efi^eft. We have no idea of this connexion; nor even any diilinft notion what it is we defire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We fay, for infhance, that the vibration of this firing is the caufe of this particular found. But what do we mean by that afiirmation ? We either mean, that this vibration is followed by this found, and that all fimilar vibrations have been followed by fi- milar founds .■• Or, that this vibration is followed by this found, and that upon the appearance of one, the mind anticipates the fenfes, and forms immediately an idea of the other. We may confider the re- lation of caufe and efFe(5b in either of thefe twd lights; but beyond thefe, we have no idea of it*. To recapitulate, therefore, the reafonings of this fedlion : Every idea is copied from fome pre- ceding imprelTion or fentiment; and where we cannot find any impreffion, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all fingle inftances of
the • See NOTE [E].
Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 83
the operation of bodies or minds, there is no- thing that produces any imprefFion, nor confe- quently can fugged any idea, of power or ne- cefTary connexion. But when many uniform in- ftances appear, and the fame objeft is always followed by the fame events we then begin to entertain the notion of caufe and connexion. We then feel a new fentiment or impreflion, to wit, a cuftomary connexion in the thought or imagination between one objedt and its ufual at- tendant; and this fentiment is the original of that idea which we feek for. For as this idea arifes from a number of fimiiar inftances, and not from any fingle inftance; it muft arile from that cir- cumftance, in which the number of inftances dif- fer from every individual inftance. But this cuf- tomary connexion or tranfition of the imagi- nation is the only circumftance, in which they differ. In every other particular they arc alike. The firft inftance which we faw of motion, com- municated by the fhock of two billiard-balls (to return to this obvious illuftration) is exafbly fi- miiar to any inftance .that may, at prefent, oc- cur to us ; except only, that we could not, at firft, infer one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at prefent, after fo long a courfe of uniform experience. I know not, whether the reader will readily apprehend this reafoning. I am afraid, that, ftiould 1 multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights, it would only become more obfcure and intri- cate. In all abftraft reafonings, there is one point of view, which, if we can happily hit, we ftiall go farther towards illuftrating the fubjeft, than by all the eloquence and copious expreffion in the world. This point of view we ftiould endea- vour to reach, and referve the flowers of rheto- ric for fubjefts which are more adapted to them.
G 2
[ 85 ]
SECTION VIIL
Of Liberty and Necessity. PART I.
It might reafonably be expe^ed, in queftions, which have been canvafled and difputed with great eagernefs, fince the firft origin of fcience and phi- lofophy, that the meaning of all the terms, atleaflr, fhould have been agreed upon among the difpu- tants ; and our enquiries, in the courfe of two thoufand years, been able to pafs from words to the true and real fubjed: of the controverfy. For how eafy may it feem to give exaft definitions of the terms employed in reafoning, and make thefe definitions, not the mere found of words, the ob- je6t of future fcrutiny and examination r But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we (hall be apt to draw a quite oppofite conclufion. From, this circumftance alone, that a controverfy has beea long kept on foot, and remains ftill undecided, we may prefume, that there is fome ambiguiry ia the expreflion, and that the difputants affix diife- rent ideas to the terms employed in the controver- fy. For as the faculties of the mind are fuppofed to be naturally alike in every indivi- dual ; otherwife nothing could be more fruitlefs than to reafon or difpuce together j it were impof-
fible.
86 SECTION VIIL
fible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terrr? that they could fo long form different opinion^ of the fame fubjeft ; efpecially when they com- municate their views, and each party turn them-^ felves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which may give them the vicftory over their antagoniils. It is true ; if men attempt the difcuITion of quef- tions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as thofe concerning the origin of worlds, or the ceconomy of the intelleclual fyftem or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitlefs conteils, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the queftion re- gard any fubjedt of common IJfe and experience -, nothing, one would thing, could prcferve the dif- pute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous ex- prefTions, which keep the antagonifls ftill at a dif- tance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.
This has been the cafe in the long difputed quefbion concerning liberty and necelTityj and to fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much miftaken, we fhall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the fame opinion with regard to this fubjecb, and that a few intelligible dehnitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controverfy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvafTed on all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophiilry, that it is no won- der, if a fenfible reader indulge his eafe fo far as to turn a dt^i" ear to the propofal of fuch a quef- tion, from which he can cxped neither inilrudion nor entertainment. But the Hate of the argument here propofed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention ; as it has more noveky, promifes at lead fome decifion of the controverfy, and will not much diilurb his eafe by any intricate or obfcure rcafoning.
1 hope.
'&•
or LiBERTv and Necessity. 87
I liope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the dodrine both of ne- cefllty and of liberty, according to any reafonable fenfe, which can be put on thefe terms ; and that the whole controverfy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We fhall begin with examining the doftrine of neceffity.
It is univerlally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceOary force, and that every natural effedl is fo jorecifely determined by the energy of its caufe, that no other eifeft, in fuch particular circumftances, could pofTibly have refulted from it. The degree and dire6lion of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prefcribed with fuch exadnefs, that a living creature may as foon arife from the fhock of two bodies, as moti- on, in any other degree or dire6lion than what is adlually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a juft and precife idea of necejjity^ wc mufb confider whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.
It feems evident, that, if all the fcenes of na- ture were continually fhifted in fuch a manner, that no two events bore any refemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been feen before, we fhould never, in that cafe, have attained the leaft idea of necciTity, or of a connexion among thefe objetts. We might fay, upon fuch a fup- pofition, that one objett or event has followed another j not that one was produced by the other. The relation of caufe and effett muft be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end j and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real exillence could pofiibly have accefs to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arifes
entirely
88 SECTION Vin.
Entirely from the uniformity, obfervable in the operations of nature ; where fimilar objetls are" conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by cuftom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. Thefe two circumftances form the whole of that necefiity, which we afcribe to matter. Beyond the conftant conjanStion of fimilar objects, and the confequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necef- iity, or connexion.
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever ailov/ed, without any doubt or hefitation, that thefe two circumftances take place in the volun- tary aftions of men, and in the operations of mind; it muft follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doftrine of necelTity, and that they have hitherto difputed, merely for not underftand- ing each other.
As to the firft circumftance, the conftant and re- gular conjunction of fimilar events; we may pof- fibly fatisfy ourfelves by the following confide- rations. It is univerfally acknowleded, that there is a great uniformity among the aftions of men,' in all nations and ages, and that human nature femain^s ftill the fame, in its principles and ope- rations. The fame motives always produce the fame a<ftions : The fame events follow from the fame caufes. Ambition, avarice, felf-love, vanity, friendlhp, generofity, public fpirit ; thefe paflions, mixed in various degrees, and dillributed through fociety, have been, from the beginning of the world, and ftill are, the fource of all the ac- tions and enterprizes, which have ever been obfer\- ed among mankind. Would you know the fen- timents, inclinations, and courle of life of the Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and actions of the French and Englifli . You cannot be much miftaken in transferring to the former mojl of the obfervations, which you have made
v.'ith
of Liberty and Necessity. S^
■with regard to the latter. Mankind are fc much the fame, in all times and places that hiftory in- forms us of nothing new or ftrange in this parti- cular. Its chief ufe is only to difcover the con- ftant and univerfal principles of human nature, by fliewing men in all varieties of circumftances and fituations, and furnifhing us with materials, from which we may form our obfervations, and become acquainted with the regular fprings of human ac- tion and behaviour. Thefe records of wars, in- trigues, fa6\ions, and revolutions, are fo many collections of experiments, by which the politi- cian or moral philofopher fixes the principles of his fcience ; in the fame manner as the phyfician or natural philofopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other external ob- jedls, by the experiments, which he forms con- cerning them. Not are the earth, water, and other elements, examined by Ariftotle, and Hippocrates, more like to thofe, which at prefent lie under our obfervation, than the men, defcribed by Polybius and Tacitus, are to thofe, who now govern the world.
Should a traveller, returning from a far coun- try, bring us an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we were ever acquainted ; men, who were entirely divefted of avarice, ambi- tion, or revenge ; who knew no pleafure but friend- fhip, generofity, and public fpirit ; we fhould im- mediately, from thefe circumftances, dete6t the falfehood, and prove him a liar, with the fame certainty as if he had ftuffed his narration with ftories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and pro- digies. And if we would explode any forgery in hiftory, we cannot make ufe of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the aftions, afcrib- ed to any perfon, are diredlly contrary to the courfe of nature, and that no human motives, in fuch circumftances, could ever induce him to fuch a
condud.
9d SECTION VIII.
condufl. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be fufpefted, when he defcribes the fu- pernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried on fingly to attack multitudes, as when he defcribes his fupernatural force and adivity, by which he was able to refift them. So readily and univerfally do we acknowledge a uniformity in hu- man motives and adlions as well as in the operati- ons of body.
Hence likewife the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of bufinefs and company, in order to inftru(5t us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as fpeculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclina- tions and motives, from their a6tions, expreffions, and even geftures ; and again, defcend to the in- terpretation of their anions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general ob- fervations, treafured up by a courfe of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and ap- pearances no longer deceive us. Public declarati- ons pafs for the fpecious colouring of a caufe. And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfe<5t difinte- reftednefs, fo often pretended to, is never expedled in multitudes and parties ; feldom in their lea- ders ; and fcarcely even in individuals of any rank or ftation. But were there no uniformity in hu- man adions, and were every experiment, which wc could form of this kind, irregular and ano- malous, it were impoiTible to collect any general obfervations concerning mankind ; and no expe- rience, however accurately digclled by retieftion, would ever ferve to any purpofe. Why is the ^ged hufbandman more ilcilful in his calling than the young beginner, but becaufe there is a cer- tain uniformity in the operation of the fun, rain,
and
Of Liberty and Necessity. 91
and earth, towards the production of vegeta- bles ; and experience teaches the old pradtitioner the rules, by which this operation is governed and dirc<fled.
We mufl not, however, expeft, that this uni- formity of human adlions fhould be carried to fiich a leneth, as that all men, in the fame circum- ftances, will always adl precifely in the fame man- ner, without making any allowance for the diver- fity of characT:ers, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from obferving the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to- form a greater variety of maxims, which ftill fuppofe a degree of uniformity and re- gularity.
Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries ? We learn thence the great force of cultom and education, which mould the human mind from its infancy, and form it into a fixed and eftablifhed chara£ter. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one fex very unlike that of the other ? It is thence we become acquainted with the different characters,- which nature has impreffed upon the fexes, and which fhe preferves with con- ftancy and regularity. Are the adtions of the fame perfon much diverfified in the different pe- riods of his life, from infancy to old age ? This affords room for many general obfervations con- cerning the gradual change of our fentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims, which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual, have a uniformity in their influence; otherwife our acquaintance with the perfons and our obfervation of their condu6t, could never teach us their difpofitions, or ferve to dire6l our behavi-
our with regard to them.
I grant
92 SECTION viir.
I grant it pofTible to find fome adions, which feem to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the meafures of condiid:, which have ever been eftablijfhed for the government of men. But if v/e would willingly know, what judgment fliould be formed of fuch ir- regular and extraordinary aftions ; we may con- fider the fentiments, commonly entertained with regard to thofe irregular events, which appear in the courfe of nature, and the operations of exter- nal objefls. All caufes are not conjoined to their ufual effects, with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be difappoint- ed of his aim, as well as the politician, who di- redls the condud; of fenfible and intelligent agents.
The vulgar, who take things according to their firft appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to fuch an uncertainty in the caufes as makes the latter often fail of their ufual influence; though they meet with no impediment in their operati- on. But philofophers, obferving, that, almoft in every part of nature, there is contained a vaft va- riety of fprings and principles, which are hid, by reafon of their minutenefs or remotenefs, find, that it is at leaft poffible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the caufe, but from the fecret operation of contrary caufes. This pofTibility is converted into certainty by farther ob- fcrvation ; when they remark, that, upon an exa£t fcrutiny, a contrariety of efiefts always betrays a contrariety of caufes, and proceeds from their mu- tual oppofition. A peafant can give no better reafon for the Hopping of any clock or watch than to fay that it does not commonly go right : But an artift: eafily perceives, that the fame force in the fpring or pendulum has always the fame influence on the wheels j but fails of its ufual efl^edt, perhaps by reafon of a grain of duft:, which puts a ftop to
the
or Liberty and Necessity. 97
the whole movement. From the obfervation o feveral parallel inftances, philofophers form a maxim, that the connexion between all caiil'es and effects is equally neceffary, and that its Teeming uncertainty in fome inllances proceeds from the fe- cret oppofition of contrary caufes.
Thus for inftance, in the human body, when the ufual fymptoms of health or ficknefs difappoint our expectation -, when medicines operate not with their wonted powers j when irregular events fol- low from any particular caufe j the philofopher and phyfician are not furprized at the matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the neceffity and uniformity of thofe principles, by which the animal oeconomy is conducted. They know, that a human body is a mighty complicated machine : That many fecret powers lurk in it, which are al- together beyond our comprehenfion : That to us it muft often appear very uncertain in its operations : And that therefore the irregular events, which out- wardly difcover themfelves, can be no proof, that the laws of nature are not obferved with the greateft regularity in its internal operations and government.
The philofopher, if he be confident, muft apply the fame reafoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The moft irregular and un- expected refolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by thofe, who know every particular circumftance of their chara6ler and fituation. A perfon of an obliging difpofition gives a peevifh. anfwer . But he has the toothake, or has not dined. A ftupid fellow difcovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage : But he has met with a fudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an adion, as fometimes happens, cannot be particularly account- ed for, either by the perfon himfelf or by others ; we know, in general, that the chara6ters of men arCj to a certain degree, inconftanc and irregular.
This
94 SECTION VIII.
This is, in a manner, the conflant tharader of human n;itiire ; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to fome perfons, who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a con- tinued courfe of caprice and inconftancy. The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notvvithftanding thefe feeming irregularities -, in the fame manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are fuppofed to be governed by fteady principles ; thougli not eafily difcoverable by human fagacity and enquiry.
Thus it appears, not only that the conjundion between motives and voluntary aftions is as regu- lar and uniform, as that between the caufe and efFeft in any part of nature ; but alfo that this re- gular conjundion has been univerfally acknow- ledged among mankind, and has never been the fubje6t of difpute, either in philofophy or com- mon life. Now, as it is from pad experience, that we draw all inferences concerning the fu- ture, and as we conclude, that objects will al- ways be conjoined together, which we find to have always been conjoined ; it may feem fuperfluous to prove, that this experienced uniformity in hu- man acftions is a fource, whence we draw inferen- ces concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights, we fliall alfo infill, though briefly, on this lat- ter topic.
The mutual dependence of men is fo great, in all focieties, that fcarce any human aclion is entirely compleat in itfelf, or is performed with- out fome reference to the adlions of others, which are requifite to make it anfwer fully the intention of the agent. The pooreil artificer, who labours alone, expefts at lealt the protedion of the magi- Itrate, to enfure him the enjoyment of the fruits of hid labour. He alfo expeds, that, when he
carries
Of Liberty and Necessity. 95
carries his goods to market, and oflers them at a reafonable price, he fhall find purchafers; and fhall be able, by the money he acq'iires, to en- gage others to fupply him with thofe commodi- ties, which are requifite for his fubfiftence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and ren- der their intercourfe with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their fchemes of life, a greater variety of voluntary anions, which they expedl, from the proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all thefe conclufions, they take their meafures from paft experience, in the fame manner as in their reafonings concerning ex- ternal objects ; and firmly believe, that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the fame, that they haye ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his fervants, for the execution of any work, as much as upon the tools, which he employs, and would be equally furprized, were his expedations difappointed. In fhort, this experimental inference and reafoning concerning the adions of others en- ters fo much into human life, that no man, while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not reafon, therefore, to affirm, that all mankind have always agreed in the doftrine of ne- ccfllry, according to the foregoing definition and explication of it ?
Nor have philofophers ever entertained a diffe- rent opinion from the people in this particular. For not to mention, that almoft every a£lion of their life fuppofes that opinion ; there are even few of the fpeculative parts of learning, to which it is not efiential. What would become o( hijiory, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the hiftorian, according to the experience, which we have had of mankind ? How could politics be a fcience, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon fociety ? Where would be
the
96 SECTION VIII.
the foundation of morals^ if particular charafters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular fentiments, and if thefe fentinrjents had no conftant operation on actions ? And with what pretence could we employ our criticijm upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the condu(5l and fentiment of his a61:ors, either na- tural or unnatural, to fuch characters, and in fuch circumftances ? It feems almoft impofiible, there- fore, to engage, either in fcience or aftion of any kind, without acknowledging the doclrine of ne- cefTity, and this inference from motives to voluntary adtions ; from characters to conduft.
And indeed, when we confider how aptly yiatural and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we fhall make no fcruple to allow, that they are of the fame nature, and de- rived Yrom the fame principles. A prifoner, who has neither money nor intereft, difcovers the im- polTibility of his efcape, as well when he confiders the obftinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars, •with which he is furrounded ; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chufes rather to work upon the ftone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The fame prifoner, when condufted to the fcafFold, forefces his death as certainly from the conftancy and fidelity, of his guards, as from the operation of the ax or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas : The refufal of the foldiers to confent to his efcape ; the aftion of the executioner \ the feparation of the head and body ; bleeding, convulfive motions, and death. Here is a connefted chain of natural caufes and voluntary aftions ; but the mind feels no dif- ference between them, in palTing from one link to another : Nor is lefs certain of the future event than if it were conncd:ed with the objcdls prefent to the memory or fenfes, by a train of caufes, ce- mented together by what we are pleafed to call a
fhyfical
Of L I B E R T V and Necessitv. 97
phyf:c(il ntCQ^xiy. The fame experienced union has the fame effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and adlions ; or figure and motion. We may change the names of things ; but their nature and their operation on die under- ftandino; never chano;e.
Were a man, whom I know to be honed and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friend- fhip, to come into my houfe, where I am furround- ed with my fervants, I reft afTured, that he is not to ftab me before he leaves it, in order to rob me of my filver ftandil"h j and I no more fufucil this event, than the falling of the houfe itfelf which is new, and folidly built and founded. — But be may have been feized with a Judden and unknown frenzy. — So may a fudden earthquake arife, and fliake and tumble my houfe about my ears. I fhall therefore change the fuppofitions. I fhall fay, that I know with certainty, that he is not to put his hand into the fire, and hold it there, till it be confumed : And this event, I think I can foretell with the fame affiirance, as that, if he throw him- felf out at the windov/, and meet with no obftruc- tion, he will not remain a moment fufpended in the air. No fufpicion of an unknown frenzy can give the leaft pollibility to the former event, which is fo contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A inan who at noon leaves his purfe full of gold on the pavement at Charing-Crofs, may as well expe6t that it will fiy away like a feather, as that he will find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reafonings contain in- ferences of a fimilar nature, attended with more or lefs degrees of certainty, proportioned to our ex- perience of the ufual condud of mankind in fuch particular fituations.
Vol. II. H I have
98 SECTION VIII.
1 have frequently confidered, what could pofli- bly be the reafon, why all mankind, though they have ever, without hefitation, acknowledged the dodrine of neceffity, in their whole practice and reafoning, have yet difcovered luch a reludlance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather fnewn a propenfity, in all ages, to profefs the contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for, after the following manner. If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effedls from their caufes, we fiiall find, that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our know- ledge of this relation, than barely to obferve, that particular objetts are confiantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a cufiomary tranfi- t'lon^ from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclufion concerning human ignorance be the refult of the flri(fteft fcrutiny of this fubjecl, men Hill entertain a flrong propenfity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive fomething like a necefTary connexion between the caufe and the effedl. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and feel no fuch connexion of the motive and the ac- tion ; they are thence apt to fuppofe, that there is a diflerence between the effects, which refult from ma- terial force, and thofe which arile from thought and intelligence. But beinn; once convinced, that we know nothing farther ol caufation of any kind, than merely the conjlant conjiin^ion of objefts, and the confequent inference ot the mind from one to another, and finding, that thefe two cir- cumfbances are univerfally allowed to have place in voluntary actions ; we may be more eafily led to own the fame neceffity common to all caufes. And th.ough this reafoning mav contradift the fyf- tems of many philofophers, in afcribing necelTity to the determinations of the will, we Ihall find,
upon
or Liberty and Necessity. 99
upon refleftion, that they difTent from it in words only, not in their real fentimcnt. NecefTity, ac- cordino; to the fenfe, in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejeded, nor can ever, I think, be rejefted by any philofopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended, that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter, fome farther connexion be- tween the caufe and effect; and a connexion that has not place in the voluntary aftions of intelli- gent beings. Now whether it be fo or not, can only appear upon examination ; and it is in- cumbent on thcfe philofophers to make good their affertion, by defining or defcribing that neceffity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of ma- terial caufcs.
It would feem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this queftion concerning liberty and neceflity, when they enter upon it by ex- amining the faculties of the foul, the influence of the underftanding, and the operations of the will. Let them firll difcufs a more fimple queftion, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter j and try whether they can there form any idea of caufation and necefTity, except that of a conftant conjunftion of objefts, and fubfequent inference of the mind from one to another. If thefe circumftances form, in reality, the whole of that necefTity, which we conceive in matter, and if thefe circumftances be alfo univerfally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the difpute is at an end ; at leaft, muft be owned to be thenceforth, merely verbal. But as long as we will rafhly fuppofe, that we have fome farther idea of ne- cefTity and caufation in the operations of exter- nal objects ; at the fame time, that we can find nothing farther, in the voluntary aflions of the mind ; there is no pofTibility of bringing the c[ueflion t;o any determinate iflue, while we pro-
H Q, ceed
TOO SECTION virr.
ceed upon fo erroneous a fuppofition. The on^ ly method of undeceiving us, is> to mount up higher] to examine the narrow extent of fcience when applied to material caiifes j and to convince- ourfelves, that all we know of them, is, the con- ilant conjun6lion and inference above mention- ed. We may, perhaps, find, that it is with diffi- culty we are induced to fix fuch narrow limits to hu- man underftanding : But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the' a6lions of the will. For as it is evident,, that thefe have a regular conjundion with motives^ and circumftances and chara6lers, and as we al- ways draw inferences from one to the other, we mufl be obliged to acknowledge in words, that necelTity, which v/e have already avowed, in eve- ry deliberation of our lives, and in every Hep or our condu(5l and behaviour*.
But to proceed in this reconciling projefl with regard to the queftion of liberty and neceffity ; the moft contentious queftion, of metaphyfics, tlie moft contentious fcience ; it will not require many words to prove,- that all mankind have ever agreed in the dodrine of liberty as well as in that of neceffity, and that the whole difpute,. in this refpeft alfo, has been hitherto merely ver- bal. For what is meant by liberty, when appli- ed to voluntary atlions ? We cannot furely mean, that actions have fo little connexion with mo- tives, inclinations, and circumftances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uni- formity from the other, and that one afiords no inference by which we can conclude the exif- tcnce of the other. For thefe are plain and ac- knovvlcdged matters of fadt. By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of a^ing or 7iot atlingy eiccording to the deienninatioHS of the will ; that is>
if
• Sec NOTE [FJ.
Of Liberty and N e c e s s i t v. i oi
if we chufe to remain at refl, we may; if we •chufe to move, we alfo may. Now this hypo- thetical liberty is univerfally allowed to belong to every one, who is not a prifoner and in chains. Here then is no fubjefb of difpute.
Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we flioiild be careful to obferve two reqiiifite -circumllancesj firjl^ that it be confiftent with plain matter of fa6t; fecoiidly, that it be confiftent with itfelf. If we obferve thefe circumftances, and ren- der our definition intelligible, I am perfuaded that all mankind w^ill be found of one opinion with regard to it.
It is univerfally allowed^ that nothing exifts without a caufc of its exiftence, and that chance, when ftridly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power, which has any where, a being in nature. But it is pretended, that fome caufes are neceflary, fome not necef- fary. Her-e then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one define a caufe, without comprehend- ing, as a part of the defijiition, a necejj'ary con- nexion with its efFeft ; and let him Jdiew difl:in6lly the origin of the idea^ cxprefTed by the defini- tion; and I fhall readily give up the whole con - troverfy. But if the foregoing explication -of the matter be received, this muft be abfolutely im- pradlicable. Had not objeds a regular conjunc- tion with each other, we fhould fiever have en- tertained any notion of caufe and efi-ecl; and this regular conjundlion produces that inference of the underftanding, which is the only connexion, that we can have any comprehenfion of. Who- ever attempts a definition of caufe, exclufive of thefe circumftances, will be obliged, either to em- ploy unintelligible terms, or fuch as are fyno- nimous to the term, which he endeavours to de- fine*. And if the definition above mentioned
be * See NOTE [G].
102 SECTION VIII.
be admitted ; liberty, when oppofed to necefllty, not to conftraint, is the fame thing with chance; which is univerfally allowed to have no exiftence.
PART II.
There is no method of reafoning more com- mon, and yet none more blameable, than, in phi- lofophical difputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothefis, by a pretence of its dangerous con- fequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to abfurdities, it is certainly falfej but it is not certain that an opinion is falfe, be- caufe it is of dangerous confequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as ferv- ing nothing to the difcovery of truth, but only to make the perfon of an antagonift odious. This I obferve in general, without pretending to xiraw any advantage from it. I frankly fubmit to an examination of this kind, and fhall ven- ture to affirm, that the doclrines, both of necef- fity and of liberty, as above explained, are not only confiftent with morality, but are abfolute- ly efiential to its fupport.
Necefllty may be defined two ways, confor- mably to the two definitions of cauje^ of which it makes an eflVntial part. It confifts either in the conftant conjundion of like objefts, or in the inference of the undcrfhanding from one objedl to another. Now necefllty, in both thefe fenfes, (which, indeed, arc at the bottom, the fame) has univerfally, though tacitly, in the fchools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to be- long to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences concerning human adlions, and that thofe in- ferences are founded on the experrenced union of like actions, v/ith like motives, inclinations, and circuinitances. The only particular, in which
a.ny
of Liberty and Nf. cessity. 103
any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refufe to give the name of neceffity to this property of human actions : But as long as the meaning is underftood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or that he will maintain it poffible to difcover fomething farther in the operations of matter. But this, it muft be acknowledged, can be of no confequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philofophy or me- taphyfics. We may here be miftaken in alTerting, that there is no idea of any other necelTary connex- ion in the adions of body : But furely we af- cribe nothing to the a6lions of the mind, but what every one does, and muft readily allow of. We change no circumftance in the receiv- ed orthodox fyftem with regard to the will, but only in that with regard to material objefts and caufes. Nothing therefore can be more innocent, at leaft, than this do6lrine.
All laws being founded on rewards and pu- nifhrnjcntSj it is fuppofed as a fundamental prin- ciple, that thefe motives have a regular and uni- form influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil adtions. We may give to this influence what name we pleafej but, as it is ufually conjoined with the aftion, it muft be efteemed a cauje, and be looked upon as an inftance of that neceffity, which we would here eftabliih.
The only proper object of hatred Dr ven- geance, is a perfon or creature, endowed with thought and confcioufnefsi and when any crimi- nal or injurious actions excite that paffion, it is only by their relation to the perfon, or connexi- on with him. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perilhingj and where they pro- ceed not from fome caufe in the character and difpofition of the perfon who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good;
nor
J04 SECTION VIII.
nor infamy, if evil. The actions themfelves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the perfon is not anfwerable for them 3 and as they pro- ceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and coniLant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impcffible he can upon their account, becom.e the object of punifhment or vengeance. According to che principle, therefore, which de- nies nccelTity, and confequently caufes, a man is as pure and untainted, alter having committed the moil horrid crime, as at the firll moment; of his b'-^h, nor is his character any wife con- cerned in his actions; lince they are not derived from it, and the wickedneis of the one can ne- ver beufed as a proof of the depravity of the other.
Men are not blamed for fuch actions, as they perform ignorandy and cafually, whatever may be the confeq.iences. Why ? but becaule the prin- ciples of thefe actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men are lefs blamed for fuch actions as they perform haftily and un- premeditately, than for fuch as proceed from de- liberation. For what realbn ? but becaufe a halty temper, though a conftant caufe or principle ia the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. Again, repentance wipes off any crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by afferting, that actions render a per- fon criminal, merely as they are proofs of cri- minal principles in the mindj and when, by an alteration of thefe principles, they ceafe to be juft proofs, they likewife ceafe to be criminal. But, except upon the doctrine of necefTity, they never were juil proofs, and confequently never were criminal.
It will be equally eafy to prove, and from the fame arguments, that liberty^ according to that
• definition
of Liberty and Necessity. 105
definition above mentioned, in which all men agree, is alfo cffential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are fufcep- tible of any moral qualities, or can be the ob- jects either of approbation or diOike. For as actions are objects of our moral fentiment, fo far only as they are indications of the internal cha- racter, pafnons, and affections ; it is impoffible that they can give rife either to praife or blame, where they proceed not from thefe principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.
I pretend not to have obviated or rcmove4 all obje6lions to this theory, with regard to ne- ceffity and liberty. I can forefee other objedti- ons, derived from topics, which have not here been treated of. It may be faid, for inftance, that, if voluntary aftions be fubjefted to the fame laws of necelTity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of neceffary caufe^, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original caufe of all, to every volition of every human creature. No contingency any where in the univerfe; no indifference; no liberty. While we adl, v,'e are, at the fame time, afted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who firH bellowed mo- tion on this immenfe machine, and, placed all beings in that particular pofition, whence every fubfequent event, by an inevitable neceffity, muft refult. Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceed- ing from fo good a caufe; or if they have any turpitude, they m.uft involve our Creator in the fame guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate caufe and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is anlwerable for all the confequen- ces whether the train he employed be long or fhort ; fo v/herever a continued chain of necef- fary caufes is fixed, that Being, either finite, or
infinite.
io6 SECTION VIII.
infinite, who produces the firft, is likewife the author of all the reft, and muft both bear the blame and acquire the praife, which belong to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of mo- rality eftablilTi this rule, upon unqueftionable rea- ibns, when we examine the confequences of any- human adion; and thefe reafons muft ftill have greater force, when applied to volitions and in- tentions of a Being, infinitely wife and powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for fo limited a creature as man; but thofe imperfedi- ons have no place in our Creator. He forefaw, he ordained, he intended all thofe adions of men, which we fo raftily pronounce criminal. And we muft therefore conclude, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accoun- table for them. But as either of thefe pofitions is abfurd and impious, it follows, that the doc- trine, from which they are deduced, cannot pof- fibly be true, as being liable to all the fame ob- jedlions. An abfurd confequence, if neceffary, proves the original dodlrine to be abfurd; in the fame manner as criminal aftions render crimi- iial the original caufe, if the connexion between them be neceffary and inevitable.
This objection confifts of two parts, which we Ihall examine feparately; FirJ}^ that, if human aftions can be traced up, by a neceffary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on ac- count of the infinite perfeftion of that Being, from whom they are derived, and who can in- tend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, Secondly^ if they be criminal, we muft retrafl the attribute of perfection, which we afcribe to the Deity, and muft acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of n^uilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.
The anfwer to the firft objedlion feems obvious and convincing. There are many philofophers,
who,
of Liberty and Necessity, 107
who, after an cxaft fcrutiny of all the phaenomena of nature, conclude, that the Whole, confidered as one iyftem, is, in every period of its exiftence, ordered with perfe£l benevolence ; and that the utmoft polTible happinefs will, in the end, refult to all created beings, without any mixture of po- fitive or abfolute ill and mifery. Every phyfical ill, fay they, makes an efiential part of this bene- volent fyltem, and could not poITibly be removed, even by the Deity himfelf, confidered as a wife agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excludino; o;reater g-ood, which will refult from it. From this theory, fome philofophers, and the an- cient Stoics among the reft, derived a topic of con- folation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils, that thofe ills, under which they la- boured, were, in reality, goods to the univerfe; and that to an enlarged view, which could com- prehend the whole fyftem of nature, every event became an objedt of joy and exultation. But though this topic be fpecious and fublime, it was foon found in pra6lice weak and ineffedluai. You would furely more irritate, than appeafe a man, lying under the racking pains of the gout, by preaching up to him the redlitude of thofe gene- ral laws, which produced the malignent humours in his body, and led them through the proper ca- nals, to the finews and nerves, where they now excite fuch acute torments. Thefe enlarged views may, for a moment, pleafe the imagination of a fpeculative man, who is placed in eafe andfecurity; but neither can they dwell with conftancy on his mind, even though undifturbed by the emotions of pain or paflion ; much lefs can they maintain their ground, when attacked by fuch powerful an- tagonifts. The affedtions take a narrower and more natural furvey of their obje6t; and by an oecono- my, more fuitable to the infirmity of human
minds.
io8 SECTION VIII.
minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are aftuaied by fuch events as appear good or ill to the private fyftem.
The cafe is the fame with moral as with -phyjical ill. It cannot reafonably be fuppofed, that thofe rennote confiderations, which are found of fo little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is fo formed by nature, that, upon the appearance of certain charafters, difpofitions, and aclions, it immediately feels the fentiment of approbation or blame ; nor are there any emotions more elTential to its frame and conftitution. The chara»51:ers, which engage our approbation, are chiefly fuch as contribute to the peace and fecu- rity of human fociety ; as the chara6ters, which excite blame, are chiefly fuch as tend to public de- triment and difl:urbance : Whence it may reafon- ably be prefumed, that the moral fentiments arife, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection on thefe oppofite interefl:s. What though philofo- phical meditations efl:ablifli a difi'erent opinion or conjecture; that every thing is right with re- gard to the whole, and that the qualities, which difliurb fociety, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as fuitable to the primary intention of nature, as thofe which more diredly promote its happinefs and welfare ? Are fuch remote and uncertain fpe- culations able to counterbalance the fentiments, which arife from the natural and immediate view of the objects ? A man who is robbed of a confi- derable fum; does he find his vexation for the lofs any wife diminiflied by thefe fublime reflecti- ons ? Why then fliould his moral refentment againfl: the crime be fuppofed incompatible with them? Or why fliould not the acknowledgment of a real difl.in(5tion between vice and virtue be reconcile- able to all fpeculative fvfl:cms of philofophy, as well as that of a real difdnclion between perfonal
beauty
or Liberty and Necessity. to^
beauty and deformity ? Both thefe diftincflions are founded in the natural fentiments of the humani mind : And thefc fentiments are not to be con- trouled or altered by any philofophical theory or fpeculation whatfoever.
Whe Jecond objeflion admits not of fo eafy and fatisfacftory an anfwcr ; nor is it pofTible to explain diftindtly, how the Deity can be the mediate caufe of all the adions of men, without being the au- thor of fin and moral turpitude. Thefe are myile- ries, which mere natural and unafTifted reafon is very unfit to handle ; and whatever fyftem flie embraces, fhe mull find herfelf involved in inex- tricable difficulties, and even contradiflions, at every llep which fhe takes with regard to fuch fubje6ls. To reconcile the indifi^erence and con- tingency of human actions with prefcience ; or to defend abfolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of fin, has been found hi- therto to exceed all the power of philofophy. Hap- py, if Ihe be thence fenfible of her temerity, when fhe pries into thefe fublime mylteries; and leaving a fcene fo full of obfcurities and perplexities, re- turn, with fuitable modeily, to her true and pro- per province, the examination of common life; where fiie will find difficulties enow to employ her enquiries, without launching into fo boundlefs aa ©cean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction !
SECTION
( >II )
"l*—
S E C T I O N IX.
Of the Reason of Animals.
jr\LL our reafonings concerning matter of faiSt are founded on a fpecies of Analogy, which leads us to expeft from any caufe the fame events, which we have obferved to refult from fimilar caufes. Where the caufes are entirely fimilar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is re- garded as certain and conclufive : Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he fees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohefion of parrs -, as in all other inflances, which have ever fallen under his obfervation. But where the ob- je6ls have not fo exa£t a fimilarity, the analogy is jefs perfect, and the inference is lefs conclufive; though ftill it has fome force, in proportion to the degree of fimilarity and refemblance. The anato- mical obfervations, formed upon one animal, are, by this fpecies of reafoning, extended to all ani- mals ; and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for inftance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fifh, it forms a ftrong prefumption, that the fame prin- ciple has place in all. Thefe analogical obferva- tions may be carried farther, even to this fcience,
of
ill SECTION IX.
of which we are now treating ; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the underftand- ing, or the origin and connexion of the paflions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, that the fame theory is requifite to explain the fame phenomena in all other animals. We fhall make trial of this, with regard to the hypothefis, by which, we have, in the foregoing difcourfe, en- deavoured to account for all experimental reafon- ings ; and it is hoped, that this new point of view will ferve to confirm all our fonner obferva- tions.
Firfiy It feems evident, that animals, as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the fame events will alv/ays follow from the fame caufes. By this principle they become ac- quainted with the more obvious properties of ex- ternal objeds, and gradually, from their birth, treafure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, wa- ter, eanh, flones, heights, depths, ^c, and of the effedls, which refult from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly diftinguilliable from the cunning and fa- gacity of the old, who have learned, by long ob- fervation, to avoid what hurt them, and to purfue what gave eafc or pleafure. A horfe, that has been accuftomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height, which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will truft the more fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and will place himfeif lb as to meet the hare in her doubles i nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occafion, founded in any thing but his ob- fervation and experience.
This is ftill more evident from the effeds of dif-
cipline and education on animals, who, by the
proper application of rewards and puniHiments, may
3 be
of the Reason of Animals. 115
be taught any courfe of a£lion, the mod contrary to their natural inftinfts and propenfities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog apprehenfive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him ? Is it not even experience^ which makes him anfwer to his name, and infer, from fuch an arbitrary found, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?
In all thefe cafes, we may obferve, that the ani- mal infers fome fa6l beyond what immediately ftrikes his fenfes: and that this inference is alto- gether founded on pail experience, while the crea- ture expects from the prefent objecfl the fame con- fequences, which it has always found in its obfer- vation to refult from fimilar obje6ts.
Secondly^ It is impoflible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any procefs of ar- gument or reafoning, -by which he concludes, that like events muft follow like objeds, and that the courfe of nature will always be regular in its ope- rations. For ifthere.be in reality any arguments of this nature, they furely lie too abftrufe for the obfervation of fuch imperfect underftandings \ jfince it may well employ the utmoft care and at- tention of a philofophic genius to difcover and obferve them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in thefe inferences by reafoning : Neither are chil- dren : Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary a6tions and conclufions : Neither are philofophers themfelves, v/ho, in all the ac- tive parts of life, are, in the main, the fame with the vulgar, and are governed by the fame max- ims. Nature mufl have provided fome other prin- ciple, of more ready, and more general ufe and application ; nor can an operation of fuch im- menfe confequence in life, as that of inferring ef-
YoL. II. I fedj
it4 SECTION rx!.
fefts from caufes, be trjfted to the uncertain prd- Gefs of reafoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard to men, it feems to admit of no queltion with regard to the brute cfeatiort'; and the conclufion being once firmly eftablifhed in the one, we have a rtron;g prefumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be uni- verfally admitted^ without any exception or re- ferve. It is cuftom alone, which engages animals, from every objedt, that ftrikes their fenfes, to m- fer its ufual attendant, and carries their imagina- tion, from the appearance of the one, to conceive the other, in that particular manner, ^vhich we de- nominate i"^//^. No- other explication can be gi- ven of this operation, in all the higher, as well as lower claffes of feafitive beings, which fall under our notice and obfervation *.
But though anitnals learn many parts of their knowledge from obfervation, there are alfo mar.y parts of it,' which they derive from the original hand of nature ; which much exceed the fliare of capacity they poffefs on ordinary occafions; and in which they improve, littl-e or nothing, by the longeft practice and experience. Thefe we deno- minate Inftinfts, and are lb apt to admire, as fome- thing very extraordinary, and inexplicable by ali the difquifitions of human underltanding. But our wonder v/ill, perhaps, ceafe or diminifli ; when we confider, that the experimental rcafon-ing itfelf, which we poffefs ia common with beafts, and on which the whole conduftof iife depends, is nothing but a fpecies of inllincl or mechanical power, that afts in us unknown to- ourJelves ; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any fuch relations or comparifons of ideas, as are the proper oi^jecfts of bur intellectual faculties. Though the infiinct be
different,
* See NOTE [H].
Of the kEASoN of Animals. 115
different, yet flill it is an inilinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire ; as much as that, vhich teaches a bird, with fuch exactnefs, the art of incu- bation, and the whole oeconomy and order of its nurfery.
1 2
1
( "7 )
SECTION X.
Of Miracles.
PART I.
T
HERE is, in Dr. Tillotfon's writings, an argument againft the real prejence^ which is as concife, and elegant, and frrong as any argument can poflibly be fuppofed againft a doctrine, fo little worthy of a ferious refutation. It is ac- knowledged on all hands, fays the learned prelate, that the authority, either of the fcripture or of tra- dition, is founded merely in the teftimony of the apoftles, who were eye-witneffes to thofe miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mif- fion. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Chrijlian religion is lefs than the evidence for the truth of our fenfes ; becaufe, even in the firft authors of our religion, it was no greater ; and it is evident it muft diminifh in pafling from them to their difciples ; nor can any one reft fuch confi- dence in their teftimony, as in the immediate ob- ject of his fenfes. But a weaker evidence can ne- ver deftroy a ftronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real prefence ever fo clearly re- vealed in fcripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of juft reafoning to give our afient to it. It contradidls fenfe, though both the fcrip- ture
ii8 S E C T I O N X.
ture and tradition, on which it is fuppofed to be built, carry not fuch evidence wirh them as fenfe; when they are confidered merely as ex- ternal evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breaft, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
Nothing is fo convenient as a decifive argument of this kind, which mull at \e^{\:/iience the moll ar- rogant bigotry and fuperflition, and free us from their impertinent folicitations. I flatter myfelf, that I have difcovered an argument of a like nature, which, if jud, will, with the wife and learned, be an everlalling check to all kinds of fuperftitious delu- fion, and confequently, v/ill be ufeful as long as the world endures. For fo long, I prefume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all hiltory, facred and profane.
Though experience be our only guide in reafon- ing concerning matters of fa£l ^ it mull be acknow- ledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in fome cafes is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, fhould expeft better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reafonjuftly, and conformably to experience j but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himfelf miftaken. However, we may ob- ferve, that, in fuch a cafe, he would have no caufe to complain of experience; becaufe it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent obfervation. All effefls follow not with like certainty from their fuppofed caufes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been conilantly conjoined together : Others are found to have been more variable, and fome- times to difappoint our expedlations ; fo that, in our reafonings concerning matter of fadl, there are all imaginable degrees of aflTurance, from the
hiofhcfw
Of M I R A C L E S. 1'j9
liighefl: certainty to the lowed fpecies of moral jevidence.
A wife min, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In fuch conclufions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expefts the event with the lad: degree of aflurance, and regards his pall experience as a fuW proof of^ the future exiltence of that event. In other cafes, he proceeds with more caution : He weighs the oppofite experiments : He confiders which fide is fupported by the greater number of experiments : To that fide he inclines, with doubt and hefitation j and when at laft he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, fuppofes an oppofition of experiments and obferva- tions, where the one fide is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the fuperiority. A hundred in- ftances or experiments on one fide, and fifty on ano- ther, afford a doubtful expeftation of any event ; though ^n hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradiftory, reafonably beget a pretty ftrong degree of afllirance. In all cafes, we muft balance the oppofite experiments, where they are oppofite, and dedu6l the finaller number from the greater, in order to know the exa6t force of the fu- pcrior evidence.
To apply thefe principles to a particular inflance: we may obferve, that there is no fpecies of realbn- ing more common, more ufeful, and even necelTa- ry to human life, than that which is derived from the teftimony of men, and the reports of eye-wit- nefles and fpeftators. This fpecies of reafoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the rela- tion of caufe and efi^ect. I fhall no! difpute about a word. It will be fufficient to obferve, that our af- furance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our obfervation of .the veracity of human teflimony, and of the ufual
conformity
lao S E C T I O N X.
conformity of facts to the reports of wltnefTe?. It being a general maxim, that no objects have- any difcoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences,: which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conftant and regular conjunction, it is evident, that we ought not to make an excep- rion to this maxim in favour of human teflimony, whofe connexion with any event feems, in itfelf, as little neceffary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree ; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a princi- ple of probity; were they not fenfible to fhame,. when detected in a falfehood : Were not thefe, f fay, difcovered by experience to be qualities, inhe- rent in human nature, we ihould never repofe the lead confidence in human teftimony. A man de- lirious, or noted for falfehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us.
And as the evidence, derived from> witnefl^s and human teftimony, is founded on paft experi- ence, fo it varies with the experience, and is re- garded either as a p-oof or a probahility, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found ta be conftant or variable. There are a number of circumftances to be taken into confideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate ftandard, by which we determine all difputes, that may arife concerning them, is always derived from experience and obfervation. Where this experi- ence is not entirely uniform on any fide, it is at- tended with an unavoidable contrariety in oOr judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mu- tual deftruflion of argument as in every other kind of evidence. \\ e frequently hefitate con- cerning the reports of others. We balance the oppofite circumftances, which caufe any doubt or uncertainty ; and when we difcover a fuperiority
on
of M I R A G L £ S. 121
on any fide, we incline to it ; but ftill with 1 dimi- nution of afiurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonift.
This contrariety of evidence, in the prefent cafe, may be derived from feveral different caufes j from the oppofition of contrary teftimony ; from the characfter or number of the witneflesj from the manner of their delivering their teftimony j or from the union of all thefe circumftances. We en- tertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witneflfes contradid each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful charafter; when they have an intereft in what they affirm; when they delfver their teftimony with hefitation, or on the contrary, with too violent afleverations. There are many other particulars of the fame kind, which may diminifh or deftroy the force of any argument, derived from human teftimony.
Suppofe, for inftance, that the fadl, which the teftimony endeavours to eftablifh, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the evidence, refulting from the teftimony, admits Cf a diminution, greater or lefs, in proportion as the fadb is more or lefs unufual. The reafon, why we place any credit, in witneftes and hiftori- ans, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between teftimony and reality, but becaufe we are accuftomed to find a con- formity between them. But when the faft at- tefted is fuch a one as has feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a conteft of two oppofite experiences; of which the one deftroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very fame principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of afTurance in the tefti- mony of witnefTes, gives us alfo, in this cafe, ano- ther degree of aflurance againft the faft, which
they
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they endeavour to eftablifli ; from which con"* tradiction there necefiarily arifes a counterpoize, and mutual deftruction of belief and autho- rity.
/ Jhould not believe Juch a fiory were it told me hy Catoj was a proverbial faying in Rome, even during the life-time of that philofophical pa- triot *, The incredibility of a fact, it was allov/- edj might invalidate fo great an authority.
The Indian prince, who refufcd to believe the firft relations concerning the effects of froft, rea- foned juflly; and it naturally required very llrong teiiimony to engage his affent to facts, that arofe from a ftate of nature, with which he was unac- quainted, and which bore fo little analogy to thofe events, of which he had had conftant and uni- form experience. Though they were not con- trary to his experience, they were not conform- able to it j-.
But in order to encreafe the probability againft the teftimpny of witnefles, let us fuppofe, that the fact, which they affirm, indead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and fup- pofe alfo, that the teftimony, , confidered apart and in itfelf, amounts to an entire proof; in that cafe, there is proof againft proof, of which the ftrongeft mull prevail, but ftill with a dimi- nution of its force, in proportion to that of its